

(b)(6)

CIV RLISO, NDW

From:

(b)(6)

CNIC HQ, N00

Sent:

Friday, September 27, 2013 20:34

To:

(b)(6)

CNO

Cc:

(b)(6)

Subject:

CNIC CNO Update for 13 - 27 Sep

CNO,

Washington Navy Yard continues to recover after the incident on 16 Sep. Our FOH, FFSC and SPRINT counselors have now supported over 7000 individuals. While these numbers likely include repeat personnel, the high daily totals are a testament to our counselor's proactive approach to providing assistance. On Wednesday, we had 10 affected family members on board our JBAB EFAC to complete benefits paperwork. We also saw an uptick in counseling requests on Thursday, which may be related to information released by the FBI on Wednesday evening. Our Gift Cell, consisting of PAO and JAG support, is up and operating. We intend to maintain this coverage as long as there is a requirement.

NAVSEA forwarded a requirement for 1,000 seats for their temporary HQ at Buzzard Point. GSA will allow NAVSEA to occupy the space rent free; the lease for Buzzard Point ends Apr 2015 and will not be extended. NDW is working with Department of Homeland Security for funding of utilities, shuttle services, and maintenance. We expect personnel to begin moving in next week.

As discussed separately, NAVFAC intends to move forward with a \$6.5M contract to conduct essential repairs (e.g., damaged windows and doors, loose flooring, fix SCIFs) to BLDG 197. The contract contains \$1M for the conduct of concept studies related to the long-term plan for the building. I have made clear to my team that we must work closely with (b)(6) team prior to releasing any information to the public concerning work on BLDG 197.

Lastly, I am working closely with DNS on the stand up of WNY Recovery Task Force.

CNO ACTION ITEMS/ISSUES OF CONCERN: NTR

CNO SA/FYI ITEMS:

(b)(6)

CNO RFI RESPONSES: NTR

PERIODIC UPDATES:

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

FLAG TRAVEL/LEAVE: NTR

V/R^{(b)(6)}

(b)(6)

CIV RLSO, NDW

From:

(b)(6)

CNIC HQ, N00P

Sent:

Friday, September 27, 2013 17:04

To:

(b)(6)

CNIC HQ, N00

Cc:

(b)(6)

Cc:

(b)(6)

Subject:
Signed By:

CNIC PA End of Week Report for 27 SEP 13
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

BIG ROCKS

-- HQ, NDW / WNY Shooting: Established Task Force PA Cell at HQ with PA personnel from CNIC, NDW and CHINFO. Conducted local and national media events 26-27 SEP, highlighting EFAC operations and other support efforts. Media engaged include: AP, NBC News, WA Post, Navy Times and local DC TV/radio media.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

CODEL / STAFFDEL / DV VISITS

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

INITIATIVES / SPECIAL PROJECTS / NOTABLES

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

PLAYING FIELD

(b)(6)

COMMUNICATION PLANS / BRIEFING CARDS

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

UPCOMING SIGNIFICANT CNIC ENTERPRISE EVENTS

(b)(6)

Vr,
(b)(6)

(b)(6) USN
Director of Public Affairs
Commander, Navy Installations Command
W: 202.685.0867
C: (b)(6)
<http://www.cnic.navy.mil>
<http://facebook.com/navyinstallations>
<http://twitter.com/cnichq>

"Fleet, Fighter, Family"

(b)(6)

CIV RLSO, NDW

From: (b)(6) JB Anacostia/Bolling HQ, JB00
Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2013 15:53
To: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Cc:

(b)(6)

Subject: FBI Family Briefing at the Bolling Club
Signed By: (b)(6)

Importance: High

Good Afternoon, (b)(6)

The FBI will be holding a Family Briefing on Thursday, 19 Sep at 1030 in the Tuskegee Room at Bolling Club. They will be briefing the families of the victims concerning the ongoing investigation and will provide all info on where to get assistance (the EFAC being the primary site) in addition to providing phone numbers and directions to building 72.

We have the room set up as per their specifications. They requested a phone line for some members to call in if they desire and we have fulfilled that request. We will have medical support standing by if needed. Base access issues are covered. The FBI does not wish to have any senior level leadership at this briefing offering condolences; however, they would be willing to have a Navy representative make a short introduction.

It's my feeling we should stand back, be ready to provide additional resources and let them do their business. That would mean not sending anyone to make introductory remarks. I fully understand, however, this decision is above my pay grade.

Standing by to assist.

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

CIV RLISO, NDW

From: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00P
Sent: Saturday, September 28, 2013 21:20
To:
Cc:

(b)(6)

Subject: Fw: ASSOCIATED PRESS FOIA REQUEST, 9/28/2013
Attachments: NDW FOIA REQUEST.docx

(b)(6)
Below and attached is a FOIA request from AP Law Enforcement reporter Eric Tucker sent to myself and the NDW PAO, for info pertaining to NSAW base security and radio-related issues.

I have not responded back.

Vr and Wr,
(b)(6)

(b)(6) USN
Director of Public Affairs
Commander, Navy Installations Command
202.685.0867 (DSN 325)
C:(b)(6)
<http://www.cnic.navy.mil>

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"Fleet, Fighter, Family"

From: Tucker, Eric [mailto:etucker@ap.org]
Sent: Saturday, September 28, 2013 04:41 PM
To: (b)(6) |>
Cc: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00P
Subject: ASSOCIATED PRESS FOIA REQUEST, 9/28/2013

Dear (b)(6) ,

I wasn't sure exactly to whom I should address this but I wanted to send this to your attention. If you and (b)(6) (b)(6) are not the correct individuals, then I trust that you will make sure this reaches the appropriate destination. Thank you very much for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Eric Tucker

(b)(6)

CIV RLSD, NDW

From: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Sent: Sunday, September 29, 2013 8:48
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Fw: ASSOCIATED PRESS FOIA REQUEST, 9/28/2013
Attachments: NDW FOIA REQUEST.docx

(b)(6)

Pls take this for action.

R/(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00P
Sent: Saturday, September 28, 2013 09:20 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: Fw: ASSOCIATED PRESS FOIA REQUEST, 9/28/2013

(b)(6)

Below and attached is a FOIA request from AP Law Enforcement reporter Eric Tucker sent to myself and the NDW PAO, for info pertaining to NSAW base security and radio-related issues.

I have not responded back.

Vr and Wr,

(b)(6)

(b)(6) USN
Director of Public Affairs
Commander, Navy Installations Command
202.685.0867 (DSN 325)
C:(b)(6)
<http://www.cnic.navy.mil>

Follow CNIC on Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn

"Fleet, Fighter, Family"

From: Tucker, Eric [mailto:etucker@ap.org]
Sent: Saturday, September 28, 2013 04:41 PM
To: (b)(6) >
Cc: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00P
Subject: ASSOCIATED PRESS FOIA REQUEST, 9/28/2013

Dear (b)(6) ,

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Sincerely,

Eric Tucker

(b)(6)

CIV RLISO, NDW

From: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2013 14:15
To: (b)(6)
Cc:

(b)(6)

Subject: FW: Base Security Assessment
Attachments: CMC CNO JOINT LETTER BASE SECURITY ASSESSMENT.PDF
Signed By: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

I suspect USFF will task regions to complete the tasking assigned in para 1 in the attached letter. We should get started. Need to ensure our answers are consistent with IVA results or other external looks for which there are official reports.

W/r, (b)(6)

(b)(6) USN
COS/Deputy Commandant
Naval District Washington
O - (202) 433-3737
M - (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2013 13:54
To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, COS
Subject: Base Security Assessment

COSs,

(b)(6) ask that I forward the attached letter to you. It directs a quick look at base security and a fuller analysis due by the end of October. No specific action required or requested, just provided for SA.

V/R

(b)(6)

(b)(6) . USN

Executive Assistant

Commander, Navy Installations Command

Washington Navy Yard, DC 20374

COM: (202) 433-3200

DSN: 288-3200

CELL: (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS (20350-3000)
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (20350-2000)
WASHINGTON, DC

CNO
3000
Ser N00/100090
23 SEP 13

CMC
3000

JOINT LETTER

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps
Chief of Naval Operations
To: Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command
Commander, Marine Forces Command
Subj: BASE, STATION, AND INSTALLATION PHYSICAL SECURITY
ASSESSMENT

1. Provide a "Quick Look" assessment into current physical security and access control measures at U.S. Navy and Marine Corps owned and operated installations world-wide. Your assessment should address, but not be limited to, adequacy of Navy and Marine Corps physical security directives, as well as compliance with all directives and policies governing physical security and access control. Identify discrepancies across our bases, stations, and installations in their ability to comply with these directives and policies. This assessment is separate from the investigation of the Washington Navy Yard incident. This assessment shall be completed and forwarded no later than 27 September 2013.

2. Conduct a second, more thorough physical security review that determines whether current procedures are appropriate and adequate and what additional enhancements, improvement and innovations might need to be taken in the future. This second assessment shall be completed and forwarded no later than 31 October 2013.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
(b)(6)

, U.S. Navy

(b)(6)

(b)(6)
(b)(6)

, U.S. Marine Corps

Copy to:
SECNAV
ACMC
OPNAV (VCNO, N4, DNS)
DMCS
CNIC

(b)(6)

CIV RLISO, NDW

From: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2013 17:08
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: Fw: CNO Bi-Weekly Proposal

(b)(6),

CNIC wants to condense this into an item suitable for their report to CNO. Please reach out to (b)(6) to answer some followup questions he has.

W/r, (b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00
Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2013 04:17 PM
To: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Subject: FW: CNO Bi-Weekly Proposal

Hey (b)(6),

This is what I was referring to this afternoon in The Senator's (b)(6) office...

(b)(6)

Thanks my friend.

V/R (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00
Sent: Wednesday, September 25, 2013 1:42 PM

To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: CNO Bi-Weekly Proposal

Good Day,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

V/R,
(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Director, CNIC Shore Support Team

Email: Robert.n.geis@navy.mil

Work: 202-433-0697

Cell: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

CIV RLSD, NDW

From: (b)(6) SES CNRMA, DCOM
Sent: Wednesday, September 25, 2013 7:42
To: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: Deployment Order

(b)(6) ,
(b)(6)
VR/(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

V/R

(b)(6)

CNRMA Watch Officer

Regional Operations Center

NIPR: CNRMA_ROCWO.fct@navy.mil

SIPR: cnrma.rocwo.fct@navy.smil.mil

Tel: (b)(6)

Fax: 757-445-5757

(b)(6)

CIV RLISO, NDW

From: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2013 8:31
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: Fw: Former Navy Yard Security SME
Attachments: (b)(6) Fb screen-capture.docx

COS, Background on a former Navy Yard security guard. R/(b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6) CHINFO
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2013 08:16 AM
To: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00
Cc: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00P
Subject: FW: Former Navy Yard Security SME

FYI, sir. Just got this this morning. Not sure any action required, but worth watching.

Vr/(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) GENERAL COUNSEL
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2013 7:19
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: Former Navy Yard Security SME

Morning.

I just discovered this email in my Junk inbox. IT is still trying to work the kinks out of OSD's migration to the new server and its impact on me being on OSD's server (bc of OMC) and NMCI.

I'll try to secure more information on the OSC and IG complaints referenced below, but thought that you would have an immediate interest.

Thanks,
POS

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OSD OGC (US) [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 7:36
To: (b)(6) GENERAL COUNSEL
Subject: Former Navy Yard Security SME

(b)(6)-- you should be aware of this.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OSD OGC (US)
Sent: Thursday, September 19, 2013 8:07 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: Contact info

(b)(6)--

(b)(5)

Caution: This message may contain information protected by the attorney-client, attorney work product, deliberative process, or other privilege. Do not disseminate without the approval of the Office of the DoD General Counsel.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV OSD OGC (US)
Sent: Thursday, September 19, 2013 7:53 AM
To: (b)(6) SES OSD OGC (US)
Cc: (b)(6) SES OSD OGC (US)
Subject: FW: Contact info

(b)(6),

Attached is (b)(6) Facebook post from yesterday detailing what he views as deficient security at the Washington Navy Yard, where he was formerly employed. (b)(6) has been attempting to deal with the situation at Guantanamo.

V/R,
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OSD OMC Defense [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Thursday, September 19, 2013 7:48 AM
To: (b)(6) SES OSD OGC (US); (b)(6) CIV OSD OGC (US)
Subject: FW: Contact info

Second email (b)(6) .

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2013 9:30 PM
To: (b)(6) . OSD OMC Defense; (b)(6) OSD OMC Defense
Subject: RE: Contact info

So, attached, please find what he launched from his Facebook page yesterday.

(b)(6)

Defense Department Spokesman

Office of the Secretary of Defense - Public Affairs

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

Desk: +011 5399 75013 (no voicemail)
Mobile: (b)(6) (no voicemail)

From: (b)(6) USARMY OSD OSD (US)
Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2013 9:07 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: Contact info
Importance: High

Uhm.I'm going to need a hand, here.

This latest missive is load with continued indicators, to put it kindly.

(b)(6)

Defense Department Spokesman

Office of the Secretary of Defense - Public Affairs

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

Desk: +011 5399 75013 (no voicemail)

Mobile: (b)(6) (no voicemail)

From: (b)(6) CIV OSD OMC Defense [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2013 8:55 PM
To: (b)(6) USARMY OSD OSD (US)
Subject: RE: Contact info
Importance: High

(b)(6)

I wanted to bring a few things to you I just gathered and give you my perspective on this. I am familiar with the PA side of this from the Security reviewer standpoint but never have I been on this side of it. I know this is what you all do every day so I am going to put a couple things out there and get your thoughts on it. My former Deputy is a Retired US Army Special Forces Weapons/Intelligence guy who was my GS-0080-12 on the Yard. Along with him is the former head of HR GS15 Step10 Retired (b)(6). Both of these individuals along with two other GS14s followed my lead when I went head on with these issues. There is much more to my concerns that I filed with OSC and IG that was directed at the three personnel I would say should answer for keeping me from addressing the problem. My point with (b)(6) and (b)(6) is that they were set to go live on (b)(6) and several other outlets tonight according to his wife who I just spoke to. If they don't tonight because he is overseas working for a Private Security Firm, they will in the next 24hrs I believe. I know you said you wanted to have a meeting about this on Monday but I think sooner is better if possible with our current mission.

I do not in any way blame the Navy or GOV and want to help the investigation. This is my field of expertise but I also would like to make sure the DoD is out front of the story if they start with the Media. Me spearheading what happened I believe is what will be the foremost piece of their conversation and I think then the public and media will wonder why I am silent. We know why and I fully understand but there could be a positive PR approach to this. I am not letting any of this affect my duties and I don't believe any of them even know where I work. I want to reiterate that I did what I thought was right over the last 14 months and in March I made the hardest decision I ever have in my life and that was I resigned because I felt so strongly about my stance on my investigation.

I should show you the entire bulleted complaint I sent to OSC and IG and as you will see on it, they are summary points because I made a much larger statement and the evidence was on my GOV system. There is a lot more rolled up in the complaint than just Security, Illegal Hiring, Gambling and reprisal we took from it all. Being a consummate professional and standing on my ethics, I went head-on with a situation I only thought existed in the movies. I even got the gift of ulcers from it. I just want to make sure the DoD possibly uses me right now to mitigate anything that may be coming our way or allows me to talk to the investigation team. I would even recommend me being a part of the team assessing security on the bases or the review. Just a few thoughts on my mind that I could not go to sleep tonight with and I knew you would lead me straight down the correct path. I would like to meet you sometime tomorrow so we know one another if you have time.

While I was typing this I got an email they were going on tomorrow night.

(b)(6), M.B.A.

Lead Senior Security Specialist

Office of Special Security

Washington Headquarters Services

Office: 703-571-0755

Blackberry: (b)(6)

Email: (b)(6)

"Intelligence is as essential to modern armies as ammunition."

-(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) OSD PA
Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2013 3:21 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV OSD OMC Defense
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: Contact info

Hi, (b)(6)

Thanks for the call.

Please push the press directly to me. It's my job to help give you some relief during times like this. The press can be relentless, as you're currently experiencing.

Just as an FYI, I plan to tell them that because the President and the SD have both ordered investigations, the last thing I intend to do is sully the integrity of an ongoing investigation by discussing anything prematurely.

Cheers,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Defense Department Spokesman

Office of the Secretary of Defense - Public Affairs

Desk: +1-703-614-3300

Windows Internet Explorer
https://www.facebook.com/search/more/?q=(b)(6)
Bing

Facebook (b)(6)

Timeline Recent

(b)(6) S.D. through consulting.

(b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6) (b)(6)

Places

Guantanamo Bay Cuba on Tuesday

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, on Monday

Black Ops Security Services & Consulting Inc. (BOSS-C) — with Nikki Edwards and 3 others. last Thursday

Groups 11

Boycott Everything (b)(6) 36 members

(b)(6) May 19th 2013 OK Tornado Doc & Picture Recovery 10,845 members

(b)(6) Yesterday

Email that an Agency asked for, I am in a sharing mood today:
I (b)(6) was hired in May of 2012 to the US Navy Strategic Systems Programs HQ in building 200 on the Washington Naval Yard. They hired me because I was an ATFP, Security and Physical Security SME. Immediately I noticed problems with the gates and security for the Naval Yard and brought them to the Command in May of 2012. I was new and did not have enough to stand on yet so I began assessing the Security of the base. The reason for this is that building 200 was unlocked 24/7 and employees were telling me and personnel in my office they did not feel safe.
I for almost two month infiltrated the US Naval Base using other personnel's ID cards and had no decals on my car. I also noticed personnel scouting the perimeter of the base and internal areas of the base. I inquired to the pass and id office along with base security about who could get on the base. I found out an alarming response that since there was a museum and credit union, anyone with a valid driver's license or state id could access the naval yard. This mean a homeless person, person with warrants, a criminal history...anyone could and can get on the Navy Yard. I immediately raised concern to my Command, Police and ATFP personnel. I was shut down and told that the Navy Yard was secure and no threat.
I began conducting my own ATFP assessments and collection intelligence and climate from random personnel on the Navy Yard without them knowing my full title or who I was. I then developed a hypothesis and came to a conclusion on my assessment to the base. I briefed my Command that eventually an insider or outside threat would possibly pose an active shooter situation in 1 of 3 places I suspected. The three name places were building 197 because of the large number of personnel and it housed the NAVSEA Command, building 200 because it was a soft target and housed SSP Nuclear Weapons Program and Naval Courtroom or NAVFAC building because of the climate and mission of NAVFAC. I described an active shooter being able to come on the base or totally bypass security so easily and carrying out a mass shooting just as what occurred yesterday.
I was told that since I was diagnosed with PTSD that I was allowing that to interfere with my judgment and assessment. This also led to other events that I reported and illegal activities where my SES who was saying this all to me (b)(6) and GS14 -then now (b)(6) to try and force me out.
I hired a Deputy of Security (b)(6) and a Physical Security SME to work under me. He noticed the short comings in Security for the base and also began in the assessments and briefing personnel of the threat and concurred. Once they found out he had PTSD and was Army then we were deemed two crazy

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Chat (164)

Internet | Protected Mode On

9:14 PM 9/18/2013

(14) Sparly Edwards - Windows Internet Explorer

https://www.facebook.com/search/more?q=(b)(6)

Facebook (b)(6)

Timeline Recent

Places

- Guantanamo Bay Cuba on Tuesday
- Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. on Monday
- Black Ops Security Services & Consulting Inc. (BOSS-C) — with Nikki Edwards and 3 others. last Thursday

Groups

- Boycott Everything (b)(6) 36 members
- May 19th 2013 OK Tornado Doc & Picture Recovery 10,845 members
- American Military University-Criminal Justice Group 39 members
- Fort Sill OK 5/3 203 members

Once they found out he had PTSD and was Army then we were deemed two crazy Army guys who were overzealous. We identified severe problems with the gate guards and took them to the command and Navy Yard Police. We were told the gate guards were unionized and every time they tried to correct them or tell them they were doing something wrong a suit or claim was being filed. The police said for that reason, we just let them do whatever it is they do however they do it. To me that was unacceptable and I took all my statements and information and requested audience with Navy SSP RADM, NAVSEA ADM and NAVFAC ADM. I was denied this and then frame if you will or setup to be forced out.

When I saw the events on TV I had GS-15s, 14s, friends and family emailing me like crazy because they knew this is to an exact "T" what I said was going to happen and felt so strongly about it that I left the Navy Yard in March of 2013 because I knew it would happen. I warned the Command along with nearly a dozen others that this would happen from May 2012-March 2013. We may not have been able to 100% prevent the event that took place yesterday but Security is not a 100% fix all. Security first line is to deter and there was zero deterrence on the Yard in my opinion to a disgruntled worker who knew how soft and how nonexistent the security was and is on the Yard.

These personnel who held me a qualified and charged person with these duties from properly reporting and fixing the issues should be held responsible for their negligence and their actions. I have over 2 dozen internal witnesses from Contractors, GS15s, Naval Officers and Enlisted personnel who witnessed my attempts to fix this and saw what happened to me when I blew the whistle and what happened to (b)(6), (b)(6), (b)(6) my Security Assistant and two other IDs withheld GS14s that all were involved with me reporting and no longer work on the Navy Yard. I reported all this to IGs over the last 8 months and it could have been prevented. — with (b)(6) and 2 others at Guantanamo Bay Cuba.

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Internet | Protected Mode: On

9:14 PM 9/18/2013

(b)(6)

CIV RLSD, NDW

From: (b)(6) CIV NDW DLGR, N6
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 18:46
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: Fw: Fwd: Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say

FYI
VR/
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
NDW N6
540-850-5177

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6) CIV CNIC HQ, N6
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 06:38 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: Fw: Fwd: Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say

Nicely done (b)(6) vr (b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6) USN OSD DOD CIO (US) [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 06:12 PM
To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Fwd: Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say

Sir,

I spoke with (b)(6) who is the N6 for Naval District Washington. Their public safety system is made by (b)(6) and based on the 7100 series handheld radio operating in the 380-400 MHz range. It is an Army-owned system providing Joint coverage in the NCR and is tied in to the Public Safety Network. (b)(6) also told me that they are in the process of refreshing the 7100 series hardware with the new Unity radios, (also from (b)(6)) but that procurement is not yet complete. I also learned that there have been studies that show incomplete radio coverage inside some of the higher security buildings on site due to the presence of SCIF build-outs and TEMPEST hardening. These features are specifically designed to shield RF signals, so they exacerbate the problem of using a radio inside the building. (b)(6) (b)(6) says there have been union complaints about this and that they have purchased portable repeater units for the fire department to take in to help boost communications inside structures.

Based on the news report, (b)(6) (Commander Naval Installations Command) has directed an independent investigation into the radio performance during the shooting response. (b)(6) staff is in the process of gathering

all of the radio logs and system data for the time period in question. The investigating team will review that data and interview those that were involved to make an official determination as to what actually took place.

I have copied (b)(6) on this e-mail and ask that he please correct me if I have reported any of the above information incorrectly. We are standing by to provide additional information as necessary.

V/R,
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OSD DOD CIO (US)
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 9:11 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Fwd: Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say

(b)(6) ,

I need you to look into this. I have no idea what frequency band the Navy Yard first responders use. But I do know that if their radios were in the 136-150 Mhz range that band does not work well indoors. I know that from first-hand experience. You need to be in the upper 400's to have any reasonable capability. We need to get to the root cause before people start jumping to conclusions.

Thanks

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) SES OSD DOD CIO (US)
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 9:04 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: Fw: Fwd: Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say

Help please...

From: (b)(6) [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 12:15 PM Coordinated Universal Time
To: (b)(6)) SES OSD DOD CIO (US)
Cc: (b)(6) <(b)(6)>
Subject: Fwd: Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say

(b)(6),

As the busiest girl in the Pentagon, can I ask if you or anyone in your office knows or can quickly find out, who manufactured the Fed radios that failed in the Navy Yard shooting? I'm copying (b)(6) for her awareness because this is an important data point for (b)(6) - First Net chairman - who is likely going to be asked by Reps (b)(6) and (b)(6) and possibly others today.

Thanks so much,

(b)(6)

Sent from my Verizon Wireless 4G LTE smartphone

----- Original message -----

From: '(b)(6)' <(b)(6)>
Date: 09/19/2013 6:12 PM (GMT-05:00)
To: (b)(6) <(b)(6)>, (b)(6) <(b)(6)>
Subject: FW: Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say

(b)(6) might bring this up tomorrow

<http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?e=001v0KiaRyJHz3VAv0pXDA_s6F5owj7B-ZebePL6PNEuh_FiEWxKAW4dHZ4ra-YjvJWZFyMSgeSqGYFar3iPSnRxbUE8eKM1Ffl4ZHPPuiMG9mvY8itlZnZPsGqmNxA-u4m>

<<http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?e=001v0KiaRyJHz2ztuC3dJSQNS05AUHpPwnV39rpYOca7JsL1DNIfqQuxPZruGM2RspRFHtDbw pJ1pr65evnmZvmHAaD2VaCtdxw-EuW3iIYz7k=>>>

News from The Hill:

Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say By (b)(6)

Radios for federal firefighters and police officers failed during Monday's mass shooting at Washington's Navy Yard, according to union representatives for first responders.

Union officials said police and firefighters resorted to using their cell phones and radios from D.C.'s emergency responders to communicate with each other during the attack.

Initially, officers found that their radios were working. But as they ventured deeper into the building where the shooting took place, their equipment stopped functioning.

"They had to use their cellphone to just call out and tell them what's going on," said (b)(6), chairman of the Fraternal Order of Police Naval District Washington (NDW) Labor Committee.

Read the story here.

<http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?e=001v0KiaRyJHz24nQN3ZMKxTjZrNZvV1YMB_Q58Zo6oM0CkrF8Mh3fCvKHJnxUaCsoevXtPBhAGm6BGSPvA9EfrP3yETq9DtWVwehAjt6NuLilbynsWPPC9zdXyFbwUvUM3r_zOnSZhGy6TrNi8V-s38xp2ok5_8Mw-Br7mV3_tAMdWuY9Q0XKGD9iTr4GhKssoAw1pe-t4BGaQfjGC6NgY-J7aVLV7RwH>

For all the latest news:

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<<http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?e=001v0KiaRyJHz2ztuC3djSQNS05AUHpPwnV39rpYOca7JsL1DNIfqQuxPZruGM2RspRFHtDbw pJ1pr65evnmZvmHAaD2VaCtdxw-EuW3iIYz7k=>>

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Like The Hill on Facebook <http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?e=001v0KiaRyJHz0cuubs-XkkMHX2zL_odYsTLwah7zwsIbeQreqlVKtMjImoItld6xl_bncJ6FTzl9Y9WOOv_Be-d8NV8ZJUoctPzzsftMXNNicbNn9rXZghdp7pFn0q1ufFW>

Connect with The Hill on Google+ <http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?e=001v0KiaRyJHz3Ag00h0EzAfvVys9-qkbbkL4JV5lQczPuphXwT0BMxKQuNGPp3vu7WP28oSF0tf2ITzbPXm54p6SauC5J0_olc6RiCBfdDWkkW0p6y9qejjJZSWYcqN pyqx0TP_0Jv5CCSeOn1W6OW9XHkmvXNheF3U>

(b)(6)

CIV RLSD, NDW

From: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2013 11:33
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: Increase to B197 Requirement
Signed By: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

FYSA. V/r, (b)(6)

(b)(6), USN
COS/Deputy Commandant
Naval District Washington
O - (202) 433-3737
M - (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV NDW WNYD, N8
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2013 8:44
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: Increase to B197 Requirement

(b)(6), (b)(6),

Looks like our N4 is about to revise the estimate to repair bldg 197 to \$7.4M....which would require us to obligate \$3.7M in ST (+\$1.9M more than the \$1.8M we've already obligated). I'll keep you posted.

V/r
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) NAVFAC Washington, ARE
Sent: Saturday, September 21, 2013 12:20
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: Increase to B197 Requirement

(b)(6) / OPS: Over the past 24 hours NDW has determined additional scope considerations to the repair of Bldg 19 may be warranted. I propose to increase the scope of the emergency contract requirement as follows:

1) Additional A&E design effort above basic repair. A&E should be capable of designing life safety improvements identified by #3 below. Additionally A&E should secure a "human behavior" or "psychologist" to advise the design team

on elements of change that could or should be considered in #4 below. A&E will draft a estimate for the total project and produce a DD 1391 for government approval. Additional \$500K requirement.

2) Repair conditions. Previously 2% of RPV. Recommend this be adjusted to 3% of PRV based on more detailed discussions with NCIS liaison officers on areas of damage throughout the facility. Increase requirement from \$3.6M to \$5.4M.

3) Increase life safety components of Bldg 197. As a large primary gathering facility, the design should consider the addition of compartmented safe rooms in the facility, potential changes to the pedestrian entry control point, and changes to the security technology system and alarms infrastructure in the facility. Camera / Server technology may or may not be sourced from the OMN funding depending on scale of effort and determination on if OPN is required vice OMN. Additional \$1.5M requirement.

4) As part of repair in #2 above, changes to interior finishes of Bldg 197 are to be required to alter the visual reference to previous conditions in the facility. Changes such as paint color and finish schemes should be considered by the designer. Cost for this is included in #2 requirement.

This total requirement equates to: $\$5.4M + \$1.5M + \$0.5M = \$7.4M$. Based on FAR requirement to obligate only up to 50% of requirement in the undefinitized contract action, this would equate to \$3.7M from FY13 funding. NDW has this funding available.

Discussion on #3: This requirement would be considered construction vice repair, but allowable under the \$1.5M O&M threshold cap for life safety items. With the DD1391 to be produced via the A&E and approved by the government, this will document the full definitized OMN project with appropriate classification of repair vs. construction identified.

Please let me know what you think of the above. I have copied (b)(6) and (b)(6) here as they have been part of the Ech II discussions on the project scope.

v/r (b)(6)

(b)(6)

NDW N4 ROC
685-8358

(b)(6)

CIV RLSD, NDW

From: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2013 19:43
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Fw: I-Team: Navy Active Shooter Training Affected by Budget Cuts | NBC4 Washington

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6) CIV NDW WNYD, N00P
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2013 08:22 AM
To: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: I-Team: Navy Active Shooter Training Affected by Budget Cuts | NBC4 Washington

Sir, This clip ran on NBC4 Washington last night. It focuses on Solid Curtain/Citadel Shield and the active shooter drill we conducted for NSAW and reasons that training overtime restrictions impacted the training and our security. The video in the clip is from a NDW news clip we produced during the exercise. WTOP (radio) reported on the NBC report this morning. The reporter casted a wide net for information on this one and CHINFO coordinated the response.

http://www.nbcwashington.com/investigations/I-Team_-Navy-Active-Shooter-Training-Affected-by-Budget-Cuts_Washington-DC-224952472.html

v/r

(b)(6)

Director, Public Affairs
Naval District Washington
DSN: 288-2678
Comm: (202)433-2678
Fax: (202)433-3745
Mobile: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

"Like Us" on Facebook and follow us on Twitter to get up-to-date information on NDW!

<http://www.facebook.com/NavDistWash>

<http://twitter.com/NavalDistWash>

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2013 7:58 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV NDW WNYD, N00P
Subject: Fwd: I-Team: Navy Active Shooter Training Affected by Budget Cuts | NBC4 Washington

http://www.nbcwashington.com/investigations/I-Team_-Navy-Active-Shooter-Training-Affected-by-Budget-Cuts_Washington-DC-224952472.html

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

IV RLSD, NDW

From: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 7:50
To: Gmail
Subject: FW: Memorial Service Tasking Memo
Attachments: MEMORIAL SERVICE IN HONOR OF OUR FALLEN COLLEAGUES.PDF
Signed By: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) , NDW HQ, N00
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 7:45 AM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: FW: Memorial Service Tasking Memo

(b)(6) , (b)(6),

DNS Tasking Memo attached.

V/r, CoS

(b)(6) , USN
COS/Deputy Commandant
Naval District Washington
O - (202) 433-3737
M - (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OPNAV, DNS DEA

Sent: Thursday, September 19, 2013 13:01

To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Memorial Service Tasking Memo

All, please find the memo directing that Naval District Washington is the supported commander for the upcoming memorial service on Sunday. There are also a number of supporting commands listed.

Given the short timeline associated and as directed in the memo, all others not specifically called out in the memo, be prepared to assist and participate in the planning and execution of the ceremony as necessary.

For further clarification, the uniform for the memorial will be Service Dress Blues (no name tags, no gloves, ribbons). Uniform for those on the platform (currently only CNO and (b)(6)) will be Full Dress Blues.

V/r,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Deputy Executive Assistant to Director, Navy Staff

Pentagon 4E562

COM: (703) 697-7176

SIPR: (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

1000
Ser DNS/13U101069
19 Sep 13

From: Director, Navy Staff
To: Commander, Naval District Washington

Subj: MEMORIAL SERVICE IN HONOR OF OUR FALLEN COLLEAGUES

1. Effective immediately, you are hereby identified as the supported commander tasked with executing the memorial service in honor of our fallen colleagues on Sunday, 22 September 2013 at the Marine Corps Barracks at 8th and I.

2. As the lead organization, you are tasked to coordinate with Commander, Navy Installations Command (CNIC) and Director, Marine Corps Staff, to plan, organize, and execute the following:

- a. Facilities (parking, restrooms, stage, podium, etc.)
- b. Seating
- c. Security
- d. Escorts
- e. Audio/Visual Equipment
- f. Transportation
- g. Coordination with U.S. Secret Service
- h. Appropriate medical staff on station
- i. Ensure counselors are available
- j. Identify and request assistance for any additional support necessary to execute the event

3. The following organizations are supporting commands in planning and executing this event and are responsible for:

- a. Chief of Chaplains (OPNAV N097) has overall responsibility for the service.
- b. Director, Navy Staff (DNS) will direct and oversee overall coordination and general information flow.
- c. Secretary of the Navy's (SECNAV) Protocol Office will support Naval District Washington (NDW) as the lead for protocol and invitations. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and Vice Chief of Operations (VCNO), Protocol offices, and DNS will support as needed.

Subj: MEMORIAL SERVICE IN HONOR OF OUR FALLEN COLLEAGUES

d. Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) will assist in determining VIP members of Congress, Congressional Staffs, and other legislative bodies to invite.

e. Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) and Naval Facilities Command (NAVFAC) will assist above offices in providing specific details (victim and family information, etc.)

f. Public affairs and media relations will be coordinated by U.S Navy Chief of Information (CHINFO). CHINFO will ensure area wide publicity and media coverage. (b)(6) can be contacted at (b)(6), or (703) 697-7391.

g. Directorates, department directors and special assistants ensure widest dissemination and staff familiarity with this notice. All personnel are directed to be prepared to assist and participate in this memorial to honor the service, sacrifice, and accomplishments of the brave men and women of the Navy family who lost their life in the tragedy which occurred at NAVSEA Headquarters (Bldg. 197) on the Washington Navy Yard on 16 September 2013.

(b)(6)
(b)(6)

Director, Navy Staff

Copy to:

SECNAV

CNO

VCNO

CFFC

OPNAV (N1, N2/N6, N3/N5, N4, N8, N9, N093, N095, N097, DNS-C,
DNS-F)

CNIC

NAVSEA

NAVFAC

OJAG

CHINFO

MCPON

DON/AA

DMCS

OLA

(b)(6) , ----- CIV RLISO, NDW

From: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00P
Sent: Sunday, September 22, 2013 16:32
To: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, COS
Cc:

(b)(6)

Subject: Fw: NDW Security RTQs

COS,
See (b)(6) comments below regarding the RTQs.

Once we have the updated RTQs cleared by CHINFO, he recommends NDW PA correct the record ASAP with all media ho have outstanding queries on base security issues.

NDW PAO is aware of the plan, and is standing by to execute once they get the green light from CNIC and CHINFO.

FYSA, NDW PAO is also working another set RTQs that we'll see tomorrow with additional info and Q&As on base security.

Vr,
(b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6) CHINFO
Sent: Sunday, September 22, 2013 04:25 PM
To: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00P
Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Re: NDW Security RTQs

Yes, would like you to correct the record with those who have reported it wrong.

But I do not think merely saying there was "sufficient" guards on duty rebuts it. You need to give numbers and, if true, state how and why that was the right number.

The locked gate is a good answer and makes sense.

On the radio's, that's a pretty strong pushback. Be sure your facts are straight.

(b)(6) , USN
Chief of Information
(b)(6)

O: 703-697-7391

C: (b)(6)

H: (b)(6)

Follow me @chinfo

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00P

Sent: Sunday, September 22, 2013 03:57 PM

To: (b)(6) CHINFO

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Re: NDW Security RTQs

Copy, Sir. Do you propose we go active and engage media who don't have our facts? Ready to do so ASAP.

Vr,

(b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6) CHINFO

Sent: Sunday, September 22, 2013 03:52 PM

To: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00P

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Re: NDW Security RTQs

(b)(6)

My intent would be for you guys to do the push back, not chinfo. Or at least NDW.

(b)(6), USN

Chief of Information

(b)(6)

O: 703-697-7391

C: (b)(6)

H: (b)(6)

Follow me @chinfo

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00P

Sent: Sunday, September 22, 2013 03:32 PM

To: (b)(6) CHINFO

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Re: NDW Security RTQs

(b)(6)

I was informed that we have an update to these RTQs. Please hold any media release until we receive the revised RTQs.

Vr,

(b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, NOOP

Sent: Sunday, September 22, 2013 03:30 PM

To: (b)(6) CHINFO

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: NDW Security RTQs

(b)(6)

Attached are the RTQs to address the NDW security issues. (b)(6) and (b)(6) have reviewed them for PA use.

Vr,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

CIV RLISO, NDW

From: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2013 11:30
To: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Cc:

(b)(6)

Subject: FW: Potential Meeting Tomorrow (24 Sep) Afternoon Re: Lessons Learned and Way Ahead
Signed By: (b)(6)

(b)(6) - FYSA.

(b)(6) - Plan now for transportation, etc.

W/r, CoS

(b)(6) , USN
COS/Deputy Commandant
Naval District Washington
O - (202) 433-3737
M - (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OPNAV, DNS DEA
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2013 10:55
To: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Cc: (b)(6) OPNAV, DNS EA
Subject: FYI: Potential Meeting Tomorrow (24 Sep) Afternoon Re: Lessons Learned and Way Ahead

Sir, I wanted to make you aware of a potential meeting tentatively scheduled tomorrow afternoon between senior leaders from the Army who played a role in post Ft. Hood recovery. They have offered to share lessons learned and potential way ahead/recovery ideas.

The plan is for VCNO to host in the CNO's conference room tomorrow afternoon from 1600-1645.

NAVSEA, NAVFAC, CNIC, and NDW were the commands that were suggested to be invited.

This is still pretty fluid as we are trying to align multiple senior schedules and at this point we just wanted to share as a "save the date" type email. Formal invites via Outlook calendar will be forthcoming.

If you have any questions or concerns, please let (b)(6) (DNS EA CC'ed above) or myself know.

Thank you.

V/r,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Deputy Executive Assistant to Director, Navy Staff
Pentagon 4E562
COM: (703) 697-7176
SIPR: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OPNAV, N09 VCNO
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 6:23 PM
To: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA VCSA (US)
Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: Standing By to Assist (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(6)

We're still putting some of the "who" into our follow-on actions, but I am certain that Navy will want to take advantage of Army's generous offer of assistance. We'll be in touch. Have a great weekend.

V/r

(b)(6)

(b)(6) USN

Executive Assistant to
Vice-Chief of Naval Operations
Wk: (703)-697-8347
BB: (b)(6)
SIPR: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA VCSA (US) [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 6:04 PM
To: (b)(6) OPNAV, N09 VCNO
Cc: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA SECARMY (US)
Subject: Standing By to Assist (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

(b)(6)

Wanted to link you up with (b)(6) - (b)(6) is the Director of the Army Staff's (b)(6) XO - he is standing by to help structure a meeting with your senior leadership and the Army leaders that helped our service through the Fort Hood shooting incident (b)(6), (b)(6), and (b)(6) (b)(6). Initial discussions had focused on a 24 SEP meeting, again (b)(6) is standing by to facilitate if this is desired by Navy senior leaders.

v/r

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Executive Officer to the Vice Chief Staff, Army
200 Army Pentagon, RM 3E672
Washington, DC 20310-0200
Comm: 703-695-4371
DSN: 225-4371
BB: (b)(6)

Follow the VCSA on Facebook: [www.facebook.com/\(b\)\(6\)](http://www.facebook.com/(b)(6))

From: (b)(6) : USARMY HQDA DAS (US)
Sent: Thursday, September 19, 2013 9:55 AM
To: (b)(6) USN (US)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: FW: NAVAL YARD SHOOTINGS (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(6), Know you all are very busy...just wanted to follow up on our offer.
(b)(6), (b)(6) and (b)(6) will be in the DC area on 24 Sep and will be available in the am to discuss their experiences with your senior leadership. If your leaders still desire this engagement, would like to begin to work the DTG.
Thoughts?

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA DAS (US)
Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2013 7:47 AM
To: (b)(6) OPNAV, DNS'
Subject: RE: NAVAL YARD SHOOTINGS (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

(b)(6), Last night our Chief asked (b)(6), (b)(6) if he would setup a session with your CNO or VCNO to discuss his experiences at Ft Hood. He was the III Corps Commander during the incident. He would bring with him 2-3 other former Ft Hood senior staff members to enhance the dialogue. Focus would be long term recovery.

Please let me know, if your leadership would be interested?

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OPNAV, DNS [mailto:(b)(6)]

Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2013 6:46 PM
To: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA DAS (US)
Subject: RE: NAVAL YARD SHOOTINGS (UNCLASSIFIED)

Thanks again (b)(6). Very helpful. I just finished reviewing the package you sent up and it is really insightful. Appreciate it greatly. VR, (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA DAS (US)
[mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2013 14:40
To: (b)(6) OPNAV, DNS
Subject: RE: NAVAL YARD SHOOTINGS (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

(b)(6), Yes....we have established POCs and are sharing info....as you shift into the recovery phase, (b)(6) may want to have a VTC or face to face with a few of our folks.

Always good to support a friend!
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OPNAV, DNS [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2013 2:30 PM
To: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA DAS (US)
Subject: RE: NAVAL YARD SHOOTINGS (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(6) I spoke to (b)(6). He says you guys hooked up. Are you comfortable from your end? I really appreciate your outreach and support.
VR, (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA DAS (US)
[mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, September 16, 2013 20:47
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: Re: NAVAL YARD SHOOTINGS (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(6), will give you a call in the am to discuss support. I have CF two of our leaders who can assist.
Know you have your hands full....we can begin to put together the right team and be ready to assist when you need us. Standing by.
(b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6) OPNAV, DNS [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, September 16, 2013 11:38 PM Coordinated Universal Time

To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) USN (US)
Subject: Re: NAVAL YARD SHOOTINGS (UNCLASSIFIED)

(b)(6), Thanks. Very helpful
(b)(6), you can coordinate directly or I will setup a meeting with
your POC's. This will prove very useful

Thanks. VR, (b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA DAS (US)
[mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, September 16, 2013 07:28 PM
To: (b)(6) OPNAV, DNS
Subject: RE: NAVAL YARD SHOOTINGS (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats: FOUO

(b)(6), FYSA, Our Chief just spoke to the CNO and offered assistance from our
former Ft Hood leaders. CNO accepted the support. I have sent a note to (b)(6)
(b)(6) to determine his availability since he is out of country. Will
begin to sort through who else we can bring together to assist with LLs.

If you agree, we can discuss, how we could assist tomorrow. Maybe a small
team with lessons learned.

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OPNAV, DNS [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, September 16, 2013 6:06 PM
To: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA DAS (US)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: Re: NAVAL YARD SHOOTINGS (UNCLASSIFIED)

Thanks much (b)(6), VR, (b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6) USARMY HQDA DAS (US)
[mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Monday, September 16, 2013 06:05 PM
To: (b)(6) OPNAV, DNS
Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: FW: NAVAL YARD SHOOTINGS (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: FOUO

(b)(6), FYSA, wanted to offer (b)(6) assistance, he was the CofS at Ft Hood during the (b)(6) shooting to share lessons learned.

(b)(6)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: FOUO

(b)(6)

CIV RLISO, NDW

From: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00P
Sent: Sunday, September 22, 2013 10:26
To: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00
Cc:

(b)(6)

Subject: Fw: RTQ on Base Security

(b)(6) I,

BLUF: (b)(6) wants us (primarily NDW) to push-out facts to the media about the security issues regarding the WNY shooting. NCACS will be the next issue to address tomorrow. Need to coordinate with CHINFO to ensure it's in sync with the comms regarding the on-going SECNAV-directed security review.

Below is my email exchange with (b)(6) regarding the draft RTQ. Key points are:

--The IG report is not the story. Right now it's all NSAW base security issues, that NDW is currently drafting RTQs for that address facts regarding reports:

- that the radios didn't work,
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Next step would be the RTQs associated with:

-- NCACS IG RTQ should address: cost-cutting claims, selection of EID, 52 felons admitted to bases.

-- Address RIF of NDW base security, who are expected to get RIF notifications this week. Need a robust strategy to explain the rationale in context to the WNY shooting.

Working on updated RTQ now. Will coordinate with N3, N1, JAG and OGC to ensure we have the correct TPs and messages.

FYSA, I plan to attend the Memorial Service with my family later today, and provide NDW with additional PA support if needed.

Vr,
(b)(6)

I share his concern. Have BEEN sharing it.

The IG report is not the story. Right now it's that the radios didn't work, that we had too few guards on duty, that a gate was locked shut and that we sent a tactical team home before they even got on scene.

The story is that we are incompetent.

If we can beat that back -- or any of it -- we need to do so now, today. And keep doing it. I've been saying this since the undermanning thing first came up. And I still don't have an answer.

(b)(6) , USN
Chief of Information

(b)(6)

O: 703-697-7391

C: (b)(6)

H: (b)(6)

Follow me @chinfo

From: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00P
Sent: Sunday, September 22, 2013 08:38 AM
To: (b)(6) CHINFO
Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Re: RTQ on Base Security

(b)(6)

Will expand the RTQs ASAP based on your guidance below. My original intent was to put a general statement on the streets, while waiting for further SECNAV/DOD guidance on what can be said.

As you may know, (b)(6) is VERY adamant about getting our voice out there ASAP tomorrow, as the narrative is creating multiple spin-offs without us (Navy) providing groundtruth or context.

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00P
Sent: Sunday, September 22, 2013 08:38 AM
To: (b)(6) CHINFO
Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Re: RTQ on Base Security

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Vr,
(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) . CHINFO
Sent: Sunday, September 22, 2013 04:50 AM
To: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, NOOP
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: Re: RTQ on Base Security

Thanks (b)(6).

A couple things ...

-- surprised this RTQ is so short. There are a lot of claims in that IG report that I suspect we could address: cost-cutting claims, cronyism in selecting EID, 52 felons admitted to bases. I think we need this fleshed out.

-- radio's. What is ground truth about communications gear that morning? The story still circulates that they were faulty and that law enforcement couldn't speak to one another. If it's false, we need to get that out there. If true, if there is any context we can provide, let's do that too.

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-- RIF. How many? When will they be told? How much money does it save? Were any of those being RIF'd on duty and in the fight on Monday? I'm not going to let a PR problem dictate policy, but the timing of this couldn't be worse. It will feed the narrative that we are under-cutting security to save a buck. If your boss intends to pursue, you need a robust strategy to explain the rationale in the context of Monday's shooting.

Thanks,
(b)(6)

(b)(6), USN
Chief of Information
(b)(6)
O: 703-697-7391
C: (b)(6)
H: (b)(6)
Follow me @chinfo

From: (b)(6) [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Saturday, September 21, 2013 05:00 PM
To: (b)(6) CHINFO

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Fwd: RTQ on Base Security

(b)(6) FYSA working RTQ below for your team and SECNAV's approval.

Vr,

(b)(6)

----- Forwarded message -----

From: (b)(6)

Date: Sat, Sep 21, 2013 at 4:44 PM

Subject: RTQ on Base Security

To: chininfo.dutyoffic.oft@navy.mil

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

For CHINFO's review. Also need SECNAV concurrence, since they have the lead for the IG report. Plan is to push to the Regions once approved.

On a different, note several base security guards are expected to get RIF notifications this week, as part of CNIC's FY13 RIF plan. We expect this to be the next big narrative to involve early next week.

Wr,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

CIV RLSD, NDW

From: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Sent: Sunday, September 22, 2013 12:51
To: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: RTQ on Base Security
Attachments: QAs Navy Yard Shooting (2).docx
Signed By: (b)(6)

(b)(6) - Draft RTQ just in from Ed. Will review with N3.

Below is the cut & paste if you are limited to BB.

V/r, CoS

SECURITY

Q1. What time were your Navy Police officers dispatched to the shooting?

Answer: Officers were dispatched immediately upon the call for assistance coming in from building 197.

Q2: Were there enough police officers on duty on the Washington Navy Yard Monday? Is staffing sufficient to protect a base this size? How many officers were working that morning?

Answer: Navy policy prohibits the release of specific details regarding security force composition and staffing levels. With that said, there were adequate police officers on duty on the day of the incident to provide patrol response to the incident and to secure the perimeter of the installation in a timely manner. Additional support was available and called upon from security force personnel who were on the installation and not actively performing patrols or security functions. These officers if not already armed, were issued weapons and were able to respond within minutes of the initial response forces arriving at the scene.

Q3: Did the recent budget cuts at Naval District Washington affect the number of police force on the Washington Navy Yard? Has the number of officers been reduced over the past three years, and if so, by how much?

Answer: Navy policy prohibits the release of specific details regarding security force composition and staffing levels. With that said, there were adequate police officers on duty on the day of the incident to provide patrol response to the incident and to secure the perimeter of the installation in a timely manner.
(still need second part of answer)

Q4: Are police officers allowed to take their weapons home?

Answer: No, service weapons remain in the custody of the Washington Navy Yard.

Q5: Were the Naval District Washington officers the first to respond to this attack?

Answer: The first officers on scene were uniformed Navy Police Officers assigned to the Washington Navy Yard. The initial response arrived within 3 minutes of the call for assistance and the backup patrol arrived one minute later. They teamed up in the building and began pursuit of the shooter.

Q6: Who specifically was the first to respond? I read a report one of your Chief's was on patrol and was among the first on the scene, is this accurate?

Answer: For security and privacy concerns, we will not release the name of the responding officers. The responding officers were supervisory officers assigned to the Washington Navy Yard.

Q7: Do you know how many security contractors work inside and how many specifically were working that morning?

Answer: Again, it is Navy policy to not release information pertaining to security force composition related to specific operations. Contract security guards are utilized by tenant activities located on the Navy Yard to provide additional at their individual facilities based on their own unique requirements.

Q8: Is NCIS looking into whether the shooting was the result of a workplace disagreement?

Answer: Defer to NCIS for a response.

Q9: Did (b)(6) do business on the 4th floor of NAVSEA?

Answer:

Q10: Did anyone at The Experts alert USN that (b)(6) was unstable, or had been acting unusually?

Answer:

Q11: Is the Washington Navy Yard a "gun-free zone"?

Q12: Who is allowed to carry guns at Navy Yard? How many personnel are allowed to carry guns?

Q13: Why was the security at the Navy Yard gates after the event on Monday no different than Monday morning or any other morning? We had no random vehicle checks, bomb sniffing dogs, or pedestrian checks. The guards were not more heavily armed. All of this happened after 9/11. Badges were not scanned and I even had co-workers tell me they returned from lunch without all IDs being checked. This is shocking on the first day back from the tragic events of Monday. My employees and our families are very concerned for our safety. How do we reassure them when nothing changes on day one?

Answer:

RADIO

Q14: Is it true that the radios were not working on the day of the Washington Navy Yard shooting?

Answer: The fire chief on duty at the time did not observe any radio errors or issues on the ELMR system reported for this incident.

Q15: Could more lives have been saved if the radios were working properly?

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Answer: A runner was not required during the incident because there were no radio issues reported according to fire chief on duty.

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Answer: There are older buildings on the Washington Navy Yard that have thicker walls that interfere with radio communication. However, this was not the case with building 197 since it's one of the newer buildings on the Washington Navy Yard.

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Answer: As with any IT system, NDW receives periodic complaints concerning coverage, connectivity, radios and repeaters. The region implemented a help desk process to ensure that calls were received, responded to and tracked using a help desk managed by Commander Navy Installations Command. First responders who experience issues with radio performance are instructed to identify that problem by calling the helpdesk to ensure resolution.

Q19: What is the Navy doing to address these radio failure reports?

Answer: NDW has excellent outside building coverage in the NCR, but the deployed system does not provide full in building coverage. After system deployment, the fire department performed extensive coverage tests in the buildings at all bases. Many NDW buildings have thick steel and concrete walls, and some buildings are specifically design to prevent RF penetration. To address this issue, NDW purchased portable repeater systems in 2011 for each fire department command unit to deploy in the event there was an emergency event in an non-covered building. NDW is not aware of any system that provides foolproof coverage in the types of buildings that exist in our region. Commander Naval Installations Command (CNIC) has ordered a full review of the radio system complaints and allegations and NDW will comply.

Answer:

Q20: Can we obtain a copy of the dispatch recording? Specifically a computerized record of the 911 calls and police radio traffic.

Answer:

Q21. Do contractors participate in Exercise Citadel Shield-Solid Curtain?

Answer: When we have exercises they do participate, but are limited to controlling access and vehicle inspections. We have them at two installations, but not WNY.

Q22. When Metropolitan Police Department officers arrived at the Washington, D.C., Navy Yard Monday morning were the gates locked, causing delays? Why?

Answer:

Q23. Were HBC security contractors part of Citadel Shield or Solid Curtain? Navy staff and security are telling me "no".. contractors are NOT all part of the training?

Answer: We have HBC contracted access control guards at our Chesapeake Beach facility and at the Carderock facility. They do participate in exercises, but are limited to controlling access and vehicle inspections.

Q24. How security force personnel are being RIF'd?

Q25. When will they be told?

Q26. How much money does the RIF save?

Q27. Were any of those being RIF'd on duty and in the fight on Monday?

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV NDW WNYD, NOOP

Sent: Sunday, September 22, 2013 12:38 PM

To: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: RTQ on Base Security

COS, attached is the DRAFT Q&A we have been working. This is meant to be comprehensive and cover all security issues.

v/r

(b)(6)

Director, Public Affairs

Naval District Washington

DSN: 288-2678

Comm: (202)433-2678

Fax: (202)433-3745

Mobile: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

"Like Us" on Facebook and follow us on Twitter to get up-to-date information on NDW!

<http://www.facebook.com/NavDistWash>

<http://twitter.com/NavalDistWash>

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00P

Sent: Sunday, September 22, 2013 11:45 AM

To: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Re: RTQ on Base Security

(b)(6)

I'm working with your PAO, (b)(6), to get a comprehensive list of RTQs that address all of the issues.

My intent, once developed and approved by CNIC, is to push up to CHINFO and ensure comms are in sync with the SECNAV-directed security review. I expect CHINFO to pushout info to national media, while NDW handles local media.

Vr,

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Sent: Sunday, September 22, 2013 11:16 AM
To: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00P
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

Subject: Re: RTQ on Base Security

(b)(6)

I believe these issues have been looked into and addressed at the N3 level. I believe we have a reasonable response to each of them.

In my view the responses are not as much of a challenge as PA organization and communications, for some reason the RFIs we've been working through aren't getting translated into something CHINFO is happy with.

Doesn't CHINFO have PA lead? If so then let's get a PA process organized because my N3 team doesn't have the bandwidth to keep doing this (answering the same question repeatedly) and everything else that's going on.

R/ (b)(6)

From: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00P
Sent: Sunday, September 22, 2013 10:25 AM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Fw: RTQ on Base Security

(b)(6)

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(b)(6) USN
Chief of Information
(b)(6)
O: 703-697-7391
C:(b)(6)
H: (b)(6)
Follow me @chinfo

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Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
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DRAFT

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DRAFT

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DRAFT

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DRAFT

(b)(6)

From: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Sent: Thursday, September 19, 2013 8:13
To: (b)(6) NAVSEA, Vice Commander
Subject: FW: SN Visit to Navy Yard
Signed By: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Would like to chat with you at some point this morning if possible to get synched on SECNAV's visit.

Current COA:

1030 - Arrive SW corner of B201 (NAVSEA)
1030-1035 - meet Security Force members that were first on scene, get first-hand account of their actions
1035-1045 - tour B201, meet affected personnel
1045-1100 - walk to B111 (3 min), tour EFAC
1100-1110 - walk to FBI command post (3 min), quick brief on ongoing efforts
1110-1130 - walk to food court (1 min), go table-to-table
1130 - Depart

Can you tell me who will meet him @ 201 for the tour / discussion -- you, (b)(6) , ...?

v/r

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2013 7:55 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: SN Visit to Navy Yard

(b)(6) ,

A call when ~ 5 min out along with description of vehicle(s) would be perfect. Please call the NDW Front Office Pri: 202-433-2777, Sec: 202-433-3737.

We will have a follow-me car waiting inside the Latrobe Gate (8th & M Streets) that will lead SN straight to B201.

V/r, (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) SECNAV, Front Office
Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2013 7:24 PM
To: (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Re: SN Visit to Navy Yard

Sir,

I appreciate the feedback. I would like to go with option 2. I believe SN will be very interested in hearing about the on-going efforts from the FBI.

Thank you!

Who do I need to call when he's 10 mins out?

V/R,

(b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2013 07:03 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: SN Visit to Navy Yard

All,

NDW has this for action/coordination.

Rough plan:

-(b)(6) & (b)(6) will meet & escort

OPTION 1

1030 - Arrive SW corner of B201 (NAVSEA)
1030-1035 - meet Security Force members that were first on scene, get first-hand account of their actions
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1130 - Depart

V/r, (b)(6)

NDW Chief of Staff
O - (202) 433-3737
BB - (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00
Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2013 6:31 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: RE: SN Visit to Navy Yard

(b)(6)

(b)(6) will be able to point you in the right direction sir.

V/R
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV SECNAV, USN
Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2013 6:30 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: Re: SN Visit to Navy Yard

(b)(6),

I am with NCIS and the detail leader for the Secretary. I will have an advance agent at CNIC approximately an hour prior to our arrival. With whom should he coordinate for the visit?

Thanks,
(b)(6)

(b)(6)
Naval Criminal Investigative Service
Personal Security Advisor
Secretary of the Navy
Office: 202-685-8657
Pentagon: 703-697-5546
NIPR: (b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00
Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2013 06:27 PM
To: (b)(6) SECNAV, Front Office

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: SN Visit to Navy Yard

(b)(6)

The Naval District Washington Team will be working with CNIC HQ and the tenant commands to develop the final itinerary. I have copied their COS, (b)(6) on this e-mail.

Please let me know when you need the final agenda.

Thanks

V/R

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) SECNAV, Front Office

Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2013 5:28 PM

To: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: SN Visit to Navy Yard

Sir,

Thanks for taking my call.

I understand you are very busy but I'm looking to schedule a visit out to the Navy Yard for (b)(6) tomorrow. It will be no more than 1 hour and the request is to try and engage as many employees/family members that would be on base. We briefly spoke about the civilian care center for those that are grief-stricken. I believe showing him this area as well as other buildings that may have been effected would make the visit meaningful. I fully understand the FBI has an ongoing investigation and building 196 is still closed. We will steer well clear of those areas.

The visit would take place, 1030-1130. I would like to have him back at the Pentagon for lunch.

I'm standing by for your feedback.

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Navy Aide to the Secretary of the Navy

(o) 703-695-3131

(bb)(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

CIV RLSD, NDW

From: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Sent: Thursday, September 19, 2013 8:13
To: (b)(6) NAVSEA, Vice Commander
Subject: FW: SN Visit to Navy Yard
Signed By: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Would like to chat with you at some point this morning if possible to get synched on SECNAV's visit.

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Subject: RE: SN Visit to Navy Yard

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V/r, (b)(6)

NDW Chief of Staff

O - (202) 433-3737

BB - (b)(6)

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(b)(6)

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Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2013 6:30 PM

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(b)(6)

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Secretary of the Navy

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(b)(6)

(b)(6)

Navy Aide to the Secretary of the Navy

(o) 703-695-3131

(bb) (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

CIV RLSD, NDW

From: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2013 8:37
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Fw: Time line of (b)(6) Navy career

FYI

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6) CHINFO
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2013 08:32 AM
To: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00
Cc: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00P
Subject: Time line of (b)(6) Navy career

This is what we will be backgrounding today.

Vr/(b)(6)

September 20, 2013

Subj: TIMELINE OF EVENTS CONCERNING (b)(6)

1. On June 3, 2004, approximately three years prior to his enlistment, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

2. On May 5, 2007, Alexis enlisted in the Navy Reserve at New York Military Entrance Processing Station, Brooklyn, NY.

3. Upon (b)(6)'s entry into the Navy Reserve, the standard Secret level investigation, or National Agency Check with Law and Credit Check, was initiated by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), DoD's Investigative Service Provider. Based on a fingerprint check with the FBI's Criminal Justice Investigation System, OPM became aware of the June 3, 2004 incident in Seattle, WA. As a result, OPM conducted an interview with (b)(6). The investigation was closed on August 4, 2007. The resulting report to the Department of Navy Central Adjudication Facility (DONCAF) makes no reference to firearm use. Instead, the report states that (b)(6) "deflated the tires on a construction worker's vehicle."

4. On July 10, 2007, (b)(6) graduated from Recruit Training in Great Lakes, IL. On December 15, 2007, he graduated from Aviation Electrician's Mate "A" School and transferred to Fleet Logistics Support Squadron 46 in Atlanta, GA. (b)(6) remained with this squadron for his entire time in the Navy. Due to Base Realignment and Closure, the squadron relocated to Fort Worth, TX in 2009.

5. On March 11, 2008, DONCAF, upon review of the OPM investigation, determined (b)(6) was eligible for a Secret level security clearance, with a single caution to the squadron concerning his negative credit history. At the time of (b)(6)'s investigation and adjudication, a Secret level clearance was good for 10 years.¹

6. On September 23, 2008, then (b)(6) imposed non-judicial punishment (NJP) on (b)(6) for Unauthorized Absence (Article 86, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)). He received forfeiture of 1/2 pay per month for 2 months (suspended) and was reduced one pay grade (suspended). The reason for the unauthorized absence was that (b)(6) (b)(6)

The Record of NJP appears in his service record from this date forward.

7. On July 12, 2009, (b)(6) imposed a second NJP on (b)(6) for being drunk and disorderly (Article 134, UCMJ). He was reduced one pay grade. This NJP was due to (b)(6) leaping off stairs and breaking his ankle while reportedly intoxicated. There was no police involvement. (b)(6) appealed this NJP.

8. (b)(6)) assumed command of the squadron on August 16, 2009.

¹ In 2012, the Directors of National Intelligence and Office of Personnel Management ordered Secret periodic investigations to be completed every five years. DoD anticipates this new requirement will be implemented in 2015.

9. On December 3, 2009, pursuant to (b)(6) appeal, Commander Knight set aside the NJP based on a finding that there was insufficient evidence to prove he was intoxicated at the time of the incident.² The Report of NJP was removed from his record.

10. On September 5, 2010, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

11. Subsequent to (b)(6), (b)(6) began the process to administratively separate him from the Navy. Specifically, (b)(6) legal officer prepared an administrative separation document that he intended to forward to Navy Personnel Command. However, after (b)(6) was not charged for unlawfully discharging a firearm, this document was not signed, dated or sent.

12. (b)(6) had no security incidents reported in the Joint Personnel Adjudication System.³

13. The United States Navy has no record of any civilian conviction of (b)(6).

14. On December 2, 2010, (b)(6) requested separation from the Navy in accordance with the existing "Reduction in Force" program allowing Sailors to request an early release from the Navy.

15. On December 9, 2010, Navy Personnel Command approved the member's request for separation. On January 31, 2011, he received an Honorable discharge with a Reentry Code of RE-1, the most favorable code.

16. (b)(6) was issued a Navy Reserve Identification and Privilege card on February 22, 2011 with an expiration date of May 4, 2015.

²(b)(6) was verbally informed by the appeal authority, Commander, Naval Air Force Reserve, that upon his review of (b)(6) appeal, based on a lack of evidence regarding (b)(6) intoxication, he would set aside the NJP if (b)(6) did not set it aside on his own.

³ The Joint Personnel Adjudication System is used extensively by the Department of Defense Central Adjudicative Facilities (DODCAF) to record information affecting individual eligibility to access classified information. In 2013, the individual Service Adjudicative Facilities merged and became DODCAF.

(b)(6)

CIV RLISO, NDW

From: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2013 7:39
To: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Subject: FW: Version 2
Attachments: Urgent Media Queries for CHINFO(2).docx
Signed By: (b)(6)

(b)(6) Need to ensure you are comfortable with the attached responses. r,(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) ----- CNIC HQ, COS
Sent: Sunday, September 22, 2013 16:42
To: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00
Subject: Version 2

Sir,
Version 2 forwarded very respectfully!
COS

Urgent media queries for CHINFO
Second Draft - 1530 22 Sep 2013

1. Assertion: The radios didn't work.

Response:

Archived recordings indicate that the radios used by Naval District Washington (NDW) security personnel worked as designed throughout the event at the Washington Navy Yard.

There are a few areas inside BLDG 197 that, by design, block the transmission and reception of radio frequencies. These areas comprise only a small portion of the building.

2. Assertion: There were too few guards on duty.

Response:

On the morning of 16 September 2013, the required number of armed security forces were on duty at the WNY. In addition to the installation's security forces, NAVSEA had two armed contract guards on duty inside BLDG 197.

The Navy generally doesn't discuss specific installation security manning levels. However, on a given installation, required security force manning levels are affected by several factors (e.g., number of open base access points, the prescribed force protection condition). CNIC conducted a detailed review of armed security force personnel at WNY on 16 September 2013 in light of these requirements and concluded that all security manning requirements were met.

3. Assertion: The Gate was locked.

Response:

On the morning of 16 September 2013, Washington Navy Yard had all planned entry control points open and staffed. When the first responder arrived at BLDG 197 and ascertained that an active shooter incident was taking place, he took a number of steps delineated in the Navy's pre-planned response. These

resulted in the setting of Force Protection Condition DELTA - which includes a total installation lock-down and the closing of all gates. After this action, an armed guard remained stationed at each base access point to allow unimpeded access to first responders.

4. Assertion: The Navy sent a tactical team home before they even got on scene.

Response:

The Navy is not aware of any tactical team being sent away before arriving at the WNY.

Available information indicates that the first WNY armed security force member arrived on the scene in under two minutes. Thirty armed mutual aid responders (which include other federal and local assets) were on scene in less than ten minutes. At peak response, over 1,600 law enforcement personnel were on scene.

It is possible that a tactical team was turned away by the interagency unified command post based on the overwhelming number of assets already on site. Such a decision would have been made by the interagency On-Scene Commander, not by the Navy.

(b)(6)

CIV RLSD, NDW

From: (b)(6) CIV NDW WNYD, N01
Sent: Wednesday, September 25, 2013 16:37
To: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Subject: FW: WNY Radio Coverage Test- Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say
Attachments: WNY Coverage Test Results.ppt
Signed By: (b)(6)

Forwarded FYSA. VR, (b)(6)

P.S. I am holding a meeting in the morning with the following objectives:

Good afternoon, all. I want to have a meeting in the morning to more fully develop our responses and strategy.

First, I want to address all complaints point by point. For example if on date X, the Union (or a firefighter) complained about battery life, then on date Y we spent \$\$ to purchase battery conditioners. If on date X we received a complaint about signal quality in buildings, then on date Y we spent \$\$ to purchase repeaters and installed them in command vehicles.

Second, I want to hear at first hand from all leadership involved on 16 September. What exactly...in excruciating detail was observed? What might dispatching tapes reveal?

Third, I want to know more about the new radios. When did we first start getting them onboard? Was that at Bethesda? How are they working?

Fourth, I want to initiate tests of the new radios in various locations alongside the old radios for comparison. If poor performance of a radio was observed in building 183 (?), then I want to test a new radio in the very same spot etc.

Then we'll put together a tight story.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV NDW DLGR, N6
Sent: Wednesday, September 25, 2013 15:49
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Fw: WNY Radio Coverage Test- Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say

FYI,
VR/
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
NDW N6
540-850-5177

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6) CIV CNIC HQ, N61
Sent: Wednesday, September 25, 2013 03:44 PM
To: (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, Deputy CIO N6
Subject: WNY Radio Coverage Test- Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say

(b)(6) & (b)(6),

This is interesting in light of recent events, a little dated (i.e., 2008) but may be of use. R, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Deputy CIO, C3P Ashore
N61, Command & Control
DSN 694-5269
COM (860) 694-5269

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV CNIC HQ, N6
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 18:38
To: (b)(6) CIV NDW DLGR, N6
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: Fw: Fwd: Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say

Nicely done (b)(6) vr (b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6) USN OSD DOD CIO (US) [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 06:12 PM
To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Fwd: Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say

Sir,

I spoke with (b)(6) who is the N6 for Naval District Washington. Their public safety system is made by (b)(6) and based on the 7100 series handheld radio operating in the 380-400 MHz range. It is an Army-owned system providing Joint coverage in the NCR and is tied in to the Public Safety Network. (b)(6) also told me that they are in the process of refreshing the 7100 series hardware with the new Unity radios, (also from (b)(6)) but that procurement is not yet complete. I also learned that there have been studies that show incomplete radio coverage inside some of the higher security buildings on site due to the presence of SCIF build-outs and TEMPEST hardening. These features are specifically designed to shield RF signals, so they exacerbate the problem of using a radio inside the building. (b)(6). (b)(6) says there have been union complaints about this and that they have purchased portable repeater units for the fire department to take in to help boost communications inside structures.

Based on the news report, (b)(6) (Commander Naval Installations Command) has directed an independent investigation into the radio performance during the shooting response. (b)(6) staff is in the process of gathering all of the radio logs and system data for the time period in question. The investigating team will review that data and interview those that were involved to make an official determination as to what actually took place.

I have copied (b)(6) on this e-mail and ask that he please correct me if I have reported any of the above information incorrectly. We are standing by to provide additional information as necessary.

V/R,
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) SES OSD DOD CIO (US)
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 9:11 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Fwd: Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say

(b)(6)

I need you to look into this. I have no idea what frequency band the Navy Yard first responders use. But I do know that if their radios were in the 136-150 Mhz range that band does not work well indoors. I know that from first-hand experience. You need to be in the upper 400's to have any reasonable capability. We need to get to the root cause before people start jumping to conclusions.

Thanks

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) SES OSD DOD CIO (US)
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 9:04 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: Fw: Fwd: Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say

Help please...

From: (b)(6) [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 12:15 PM Coordinated Universal Time
To: (b)(6) SES OSD DOD CIO (US)
Cc: (b)(6) >
Subject: Fwd: Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say

(b)(6)

As the busiest girl in the Pentagon, can I ask if you or anyone in your office knows or can quickly find out, who manufactured the Fed radios that failed in the Navy Yard shooting? I'm copying (b)(6) for her awareness because this is an important data point for (b)(6) - First Net chairman - who is likely going to be asked by (b)(6) and (b)(6) and possibly others today.

Thanks so much,

(b)(6)

Sent from my Verizon Wireless 4G LTE smartphone

----- Original message -----

From: "(b)(6)"

Date: 09/19/2013 6:12 PM (GMT-05:00)

To: (b)(6)

Subject: FW: Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say

(b)(6) might bring this up tomorrow

<http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?e=001v0KiaRyJHz3VAv0pXDA_s6F5owj7B-ZebePL6PNEuh_FiEWxKAW4dHZ4ra-YjvJWZFyMSgeSqGYFar3iPSnRxbUE8eKM1Ffl4ZHPPuiMG9mvY8itlZnZPsGqmNxA-u4m>

<<http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?e=001v0KiaRyJHz2ztuC3djSQNS05AUHpPwnV39rpYOca7JsL1DNIfqQuxPZruGM2RspRFHtDbwPJ1pr65evnmZvmHAaD2VaCtdxw-EuW3iIYz7k=>>>

News from The Hill:

Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say By (b)(6)

Radios for federal firefighters and police officers failed during Monday's mass shooting at Washington's Navy Yard, according to union representatives for first responders.

Union officials said police and firefighters resorted to using their cell phones and radios from D.C.'s emergency responders to communicate with each other during the attack.

Initially, officers found that their radios were working. But as they ventured deeper into the building where the shooting took place, their equipment stopped functioning.

"They had to use their cellphone to just call out and tell them what's going on," said (b)(6), chairman of the Fraternal Order of Police Naval District Washington (NDW) Labor Committee.

Read the story here.

<http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?e=001v0KiaRyJHz24nQN3ZMKxTjZrNZvVV1YMB_Q58Zo6oM0CkrF8Mh3fCvKHJnxUaCsoevXtPBhAGm6BGSPvA9EfrP3yETq9DtWVwehAjt6NuLilbysnWPPC9zdXyFbwUvUM3r_zOnSZhGy6TrNi8V-s38xp2ok5_8Mw-Br7mV3_tAMdWuY9Q0XKGD9iTr4GhKssoAw1pe-t4BGaQfjGC6NgY-J7aVLV7RwH>

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<<http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?e=001v0KiaRyJHz2ztuC3dJSQNS05AUHpPwnV39rpYOca7JsL1DNIfqQuxPZruGM2RspRFHtDbwpJ1pr65evnmZvmHAaD2VaCtdxw-EuW3ilYz7k=>>

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Like The Hill on Facebook <http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?e=001v0KiaRyJHz0cuubs-XkKMHX2zL_odYsTLwah7zwsIbeQreqIVKtMjImoItd6xl_bncJ6FTzI9Y9WOOv_Be-d8NV8ZJUoctPzzsftMXNNicbNn9rXZghdp7pFn0q1ufFW>

Connect with The Hill on Google+ <http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?e=001v0KiaRyJHz3Ag00h0EzAfvVys9-qkbkL4JV5IQczPuphxtOBMxKQuNGPp3vu7WP28oSf0tf2ITzbPXm54p6SauC5JO_olc6RiCBfdDWkkW0p6y9qejjJZSWYcqNpyqx0TP_0Jv5CCSeOn1W6OW9XHkmvXNheF3U>

WNY ELMR Coverage Test Procedure

- Testing conducted January 25, 2008
- Testing conducted by NDW and SPAWARSSYSCEN Charleston
- Used NDW P7100 portable radios programmed on the Bolling AFB system in site trunking
- The test was conducted by using two radios, pressing the PTT on one radio and listening to the other radio
 - Many test points were taken in each building that was tested but the number of test points for each building was not recorded
- A pass was defined as:
 - Transmitting radio receiving a Grant Tone
 - Receiving radio receiving intelligible voice
- A failure was defined as:
 - Transmitting radio not receiving a Grant Tone
 - or
 - Receiving radio not receiving voice
 - or
 - Receiving radio not receiving intelligible voice

WNY ELMR Coverage Test Results

- 6th Street Gate
 - Good coverage
- 9th Street Gate
 - Good coverage
- USS Barry
 - Good on decks above waterline
- Bldg 111
 - 1st floor good
 - Other floors not tested
- Bldg 197
 - Good on 1st floor except at North end offices
 - Good on all of 4th floor
 - Other floors not tested
- Bldg 36
 - Good on 1st and 2nd floor
 - Others floors not tested
- Bldg 200
 - Good in most of building,
 - 70% reliable in dispatch (Northeast corner 2nd floor)
- Bldg 196
 - Basement no coverage
 - 2nd floor no coverage
 - 3rd floor good coverage
 - 4th floor good coverage

WNY ELMR Coverage Test Results




3rd St
Gate*



Isaac Hull
Ave Gate*

M Street SE

9th St
Gate*



- Pass
- Fail
- Fail



© 2007 Microsoft Corporation. Image courtesy of USES

150 Wds

(b)(6)

CIV RLSD, NDW

From: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2013 14:19
To: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Subject: FW: WNY TP
Attachments: WNY First Responder RTQ.docx
Signed By: (b)(6)

(b)(6) - I have not yet reviewed these revised RTQs - wanted to let you have an immediate look while I am calling
(b)(6) and engaging CNIC CoS on the issues we discussed.

V/r, (b)(6)

(b)(6), CAPT, USN
COS/Deputy Commandant
Naval District Washington
O - (202) 433-3737
M - (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV NDW WNYD, N00P
Sent: Monday, September 23, 2013 12:44
To: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: WNY TP

COS, Attached is the updated RTQ based on the meeting this morning. NCIS recommended removing the second para of the last response.

" It is possible that a tactical team was turned away by the interagency unified command post based on the overwhelming number of assets already on site. Such a decision would have been made by the interagency On-Scene Commander, not by the Navy."

The FBI by way of NCIS asked that we hold off on any media engagement until after the Wed press conf. NCIS PA believes some of this will be addressed.

v/r
(b)(6)
Director, Public Affairs
Naval District Washington
DSN: 288-2678
Comm: (202)433-2678
Fax: (202)433-3745
Mobile: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

"Like Us" on Facebook and follow us on Twitter to get up-to-date information on NDW!
<http://www.facebook.com/NavDistWash>

<http://twitter.com/NavalDistWash>

WNY First Responder RTQ
Second Draft - 1530 22 Sep 2013

1. Assertion: The radios didn't work the morning of the Washington Navy Yard Shooting incident may have contributed to the loss of lives.

Response:

No Navy radio system issues in any way contributed to any loss of life or hindered the Naval Security Force response effort. The radios used by Naval District Washington (NDW) Naval Security Forces worked as designed throughout the event at the Washington Navy Yard.

2. Assertion: In general the radios don't function properly.

Response:

As a general matter all radios have issues with certain types of building construction and there are areas inside BLDG 197 that, by design, block the transmission and reception of radio frequencies. We developed standard operating procedures to mitigate weak transmission signals.

3. Assertion: There were too few Naval Security Forces on duty.

Response:

On the morning of 16 September 2013, the required number of armed security forces were on duty at the WNY. In addition to the installation's security forces, NAVSEA had two additional armed contract guards on duty inside BLDG 197.

The Navy generally doesn't discuss specific installation security manning levels. However, on a given installation, required security force manning levels are affected by several factors (e.g., number of open base access points, the prescribed force protection condition). CNIC conducted a detailed review of armed security force personnel at WNY on 16 September 2013 in

light of these requirements and concluded that all security manning requirements were met.

4. Assertion: The Gate was locked.

Response:

The installation acted correctly in closing all perimeter gates when notified of the active shooter event. One gate was available and operational and was used by external first responders. Another gate was made available 12 minutes later.

5. Assertion: The Navy sent a tactical team home before they even got on scene.

Response:

The Navy is not aware of any tactical team being sent away before arriving at the WNY.

(b)(6)

CIV RLSD, NDW

From: (b)(6) CIV NDW WNYD, N00P
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2013 8:23
To: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Cc:

(b)(6)

Subject: I-Team: Navy Active Shooter Training Affected by Budget Cuts | NBC4 Washington
Signed By: (b)(6)

Sir, This clip ran on NBC4 Washington last night. It focuses on Solid Curtain/Citadel Shield and the active shooter drill we conducted for NSAW and reasons that training overtime restrictions impacted the training and our security. The video in the clip is from a NDW news clip we produced during the exercise. WTOP (radio) reported on the NBC report this morning. The reporter casted a wide net for information on this one and CHINFO coordinated the response.

http://www.nbcwashington.com/investigations/I-Team_-Navy-Active-Shooter-Training-Affected-by-Budget-Cuts_Washington-DC-224952472.html

v/r

(b)(6)

Director, Public Affairs
Naval District Washington
DSN: 288-2678
Comm: (202)433-2678
Fax: (202)433-3745
Mobile: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

"Like Us" on Facebook and follow us on Twitter to get up-to-date information on NDW!

<http://www.facebook.com/NavDistWash>

<http://twitter.com/NavalDistWash>

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2013 7:58 AM
To: (b)(6) CIV NDW WNYD, N00P
Subject: Fwd: I-Team: Navy Active Shooter Training Affected by Budget Cuts | NBC4 Washington

http://www.nbcwashington.com/investigations/I-Team_-Navy-Active-Shooter-Training-Affected-by-Budget-Cuts_Washington-DC-224952472.html

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

CIV RLISO, NDW

From:

(b)(6)

MIL USAF AFDW AFELM/CC & JBAB/CV

<(b)(6)>

Sent:

Monday, September 16, 2013 15:43

To:

(b)(6)

Cc:

(b)(6)

Subject:

JBAB Situation Update

Signed By:

(b)(6)

Dear General/Flag Officer Residents,

While the base remains at a heightened security posture, we will now allow limited essential movement to exit the Installation and/or to proceed to residences. While inbound traffic is still extremely limited, we

recognize the need for many of you to return to your residences.

We recommend you access the installation using the Firth-Sterling (north) gate and be prepared to report that you are a resident of the base.

v/r

(b)(6)

(b)(6), USAF

Vice Commander, Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling &

Commander, Air Force Element (JBAB)

DSN 754-1109 Comm (202) 404-1109

Blackberry (b)(6)

(b)(6)

CIV RLISO, NDW

From: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2013 12:58
To: (b)(6)
Cc:

(b)(6)

Subject: Joint Information Center
Signed By: (b)(6)

(b)(6), (b)(6),

CNIC and NDW are standing up a Joint Information Center (JIC) to manage our PA campaign and coordinate RTQs, etc. among affected Navy commands. NCIS will have a rep to coordinate on their end and with the external law enforcement agencies such as Metro Police and FBI.

Request NAVSEA and NAVFAC plan to provide a rep for the JIC, which will locate in the spaces to be assigned in the CNIC HQ building (W111).

On the NAVFAC side I envision a range of questions involving the ATRP Program as well as facilities questions, including UFC requirements, insight into B197 construction, plans (long and short term) for the displaced NAVSEA workforce, etc.

On the NAVSEA side I envision questions ranging from how notifications went down to family members of victims to how workforce security improved (or not) with the move from Crystal City to B197.

More to follow as we get this up and running.

V/r, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Chief of Staff/Deputy Commandant
Naval District Washington
1343 Dahlgren Avenue South East, Building 1
Washington Navy Yard
Washington, DC 20374-5161
Office: (202) 433-3737
Mobile: (b)(6)
Fax: (202) 433-2207
Email: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

CIV RLSD, NDW

From:

(b)(6)

CIV NDW ANND, N93

Sent:

Tuesday, September 17, 2013 8:14

Cc:

(b)(6)

Subject:

LATROBE GATE - ACCESS FOR RESIDENTS AT THE WASHINGTON NAVY YARD

Signed By:

(b)(6)

Dear Executive Residents,

I hope that everyone was able to make it home safely, and without incident last night. For today, security is requesting that residents utilize the LaTrobe Gate only for access to and from the Washington Navy Yard. The guards will continue to check your ID's against their resident listing to allow access onto and off of the base.

Thank you for your cooperation. Please contact (b)(6)

or me if you have any questions or concerns.

VR,

(b)(6)

Regional Navy Housing Program Manager

Naval District Washington

Office: (202) 433-3231

Cell: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

CIV RLSD, NDW

From: notifications@navy.mil
Sent: Monday, September 16, 2013 9:23
To: (b)(6)
Subject: Lockdown Procedures issued at 09:20:32 ((GMT-05:00) Eastern Time (US & Canada)) on 09/16/2013

CNRNDW,

Shelter in Place and or a Lockdown is security posture taken to protect personnel. Stay indoors, if outside, get within a building. Stay away from windows or open buildings, Remain indoors until the "all clear" is given. Secure doors and windows. Send muster/status reports to the BWC at 202-433-0226.

Thank you,
Washington Navy Yard

(b)(6)

CIV RLISO, NDW

From: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2013 16:20
To: (b)(6)
Subject: MDW offer to assist
Signed By: (b)(6)
Importance: High

(b)(6)

(b)(6) offered whatever assistance we could use on Monday and I spoke with him today and suggested we might be able to use additional Security Forces iso the anticipated Memorial Service on Sunday.

I passed him your contact info and expect his G3 to be in touch with you shortly.

r/(b)(6)

(b)(6)

CIV RLISO, NDW

From: (b)(6) OPNAV, DNS
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 19:02
To: (b)(6) CNO
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: Memorial Service Update

CNO, Conducted several telecom meetings with CNIC and NDW concerning the Sunday memorial service. Concurrently there have been meetings at 8th and I with our planning team, Marine Barracks, White House staff and Secret Service. All is progressing well with additional coordination and event set-up scheduled for Saturday. A rehearsal of the event will occur 0730 Sunday morning with supporting participants (Navy Band, security, ushers, escorts, chaplain, protocol, transportation leads).

Invitations have been sent out from SECNAV and CNO Protocol, along with NAVSEA, NAVFAC, NDW and WNY tenets commands. Transportation and parking for the 11 families will occur at the parking lot in front of USS BARRY on the Navy Yard. Families will be driven directly to the VIP entrance and escorted to the CMC house. All VIP security and protocol teams have linked with Secret Service and White House Staff. As a note, The Read family is conducting their funeral at this time with ADM Richardson the senior Flag in attendance.

Timeline from today's meeting is as follows:

1500 - families depart Navy Yard on shuttle to Marine Barracks Washington DC

1515 - families arrive Marine Barracks Washington DC, are escorted to Commandant's house for the POTUS visit with families. This is limited to the following:

(b)(6)

~1545 - POTUS and First Lady arrive, are greeted by (b)(6) and (b)(6)

When the call is made that POTUS is inbound, the principals will be escorted out of the house to the garden where they may relax for a few minutes and receive the service pre-brief from (b)(6)

Following the pre-brief, the principals will be escorted to the seating area. (b)(6) will join them there (no spouse). The President and First Lady will exit the house with families and take their seats before the service begins at 1700.

We have apportioned approximately 3500 invitations in agreement with (b)(6), (b)(6), and (b)(6). This includes NAVSEA/NAVFAC and Navy Yard personnel as well as first responders. Parking will be available both at the Navy Yard and the standard 8th & I event areas (Maritime Plaza) with bus service available. Security screening will begin at 1430, all attendees to be in their seat NLT 1630.

Navy Band and chorus will perform beginning at 1500.

VR, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

CIV RLISO, NDW

From: (b)(6) Chief of Chaplains, N097
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2013 21:48
To:

(b)(6)

Subject: Messaging about counseling support for civilians

Admirals--

Just as we've worked hard to destigmatize talking to counselors by our uniformed shipmates, we may need to push hard on the same message with our civilian shipmates.

I just received some feedback about a conversation overheard at Sunday's memorial service between civilians about whether they should talk to a counselor, out of concern that doing so would cause them problems with present & future government employment. It may be an isolated incident. Then again, it may not be.

If we can get the chapter & verse on counseling & civilian employment, we can get that message out through all of our communications channels, beginning with commanders & senior civilians, in the days & weeks ahead. I'll be glad to pass it to all chaplains.

Leadership--including civilian leadership--by example will be important. I'm confident we can get the message out effectively.

Vr/(b)(6)

(b)(6), CHC, USN
Chief of Chaplains (N097)
2000 Navy Pentagon, Rm. 5E270
Washington, DC 20350-2000
E-mail: mark.tidd@navy.mil SIPR: mark.tidd@navy.smil.mil
Phone: (703) 614-4043 BlackBerry: (b)(6) DSN: (312) 224-4043 Fax: (703) 693-2907
www.facebook.com/ChiefofNavyChaplains www.chaplaincare.navy.mil

"Strengthen the Force +++ Engage with Leadership +++ Build the Community"

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Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

(b)(6)

CIV RLSD, NDW

From: (b)(6) IV NDW HQ, N3
Sent: Saturday, September 21, 2013 17:54
To: (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: NATIONAL MEMORIAL SERVICE COMMUNICATIONS PLAN - FINAL
Attachments: (b)(6).jpg; Communications Plan In Support of Nation Memorial Service - CH2.docx; Navy Yard Map.pdf; National Memorial Service Callsigns.xlsx
Signed By: (b)(6)

CoS / XO,

Attached are the commplan, callsigns and maps for tomorrow's event. I will be in at 0600 tomorrow to issue radios to the assigned players.


V/R
(b)(6)

(b)(6)
NDW HQ N3 Technology
Naval District Washington
Washington, DC 20374-5001
michael.beyrle@navy.mil
(O) 202.433.0180
(C)(b)(6)

How is NDW doing? Please let us know by using our ICE survey.
https://ice.disa.mil/index.cfm?fa=site&site_id=811

Road Closed
1330--1900

8th St SE



CMC's
House

9th St SE

St SE

National Memorial Service Callsigns

Position	Name	Callsign	Phone
NDW	(b)(6)		
OTC	(b)(6)	ALFA ONE	
OTC ALT	(b)(6)	ALFA TWO	(b)(6)
OSC	(b)(6)	ALFA THREE	(b)(6)
Protocol	(b)(6)	N/A	(b)(6)
Event Coordinator	(b)(6)	ALFA FOUR	(b)(6)

NSAW			
CO	(b)(6)	BRAVO ONE	(b)(6)
XO	(b)(6)	BRAVO TWO	(b)(6)
CDO	(b)(6)	BRAVO THREE	(b)(6)

FAMILY MEDICAL ESCORT			
Corpsman Bus 1	TBA	FOXTROT ONE	
Corpsman Bus 2	TBA	FOXTROT TWO	

MARINE BARRACKS			
Commo	(b)(6)	N/A	(b)(6)
Barracks CO	(b)(6)	MIKE ONE	(b)(6)
Barracks XO	(b)(6)	MIKE TWO	(b)(6)
Protocol	(b)(6)	MIKE THREE	(b)(6)
Head Usher (Officer)	(b)(6)	MIKE FOUR	(b)(6)
Head Usher (Enlisted)	(b)(6)	MIKE FIVE	(b)(6)
Medical	(b)(6)	MIKE SIX	(b)(6)

ROC			
Command Post	Battle Watch Captain	CHARLIE PAPA	202-433-5180
Regional Dispatch Center	Various	DISPATCH	202-433-4201

SECURITY			
Security Support - OIC	(b)(6)	SIERRA ONE	(b)(6)
Security Support - AOIC	(b)(6)	SIERRA TWO	(b)(6)
Security Support - NCOOIC	(b)(6)	SIERRA THREE	(b)(6)

TRANSPORTATION				
Family Parking	(b)(6)		TANGO ONE	(b)(6)
Garage Parking	(b)(6)		TANGO TWO	(b)(6)
VIP Parking			TANGO THREE	(b)(6)
Maritime Plaza	(b)(6)		TANGO FOUR	

USHERS				
OIC	(b)(6)		UNIFORM ONE	(b)(6)
Gate 1 (VIPs)	(b)(6)		UNIFORM TWO	(b)(6)
Main Gate	(b)(6)		UNIFORM THREE	(b)(6)

NAVSEA				
Primary POC	(b)(6)		NOVEMBER ONE	(b)(6)

Communications Plan In Support of **National Memorial Service**

Operation: National Memorial Service

Officer in Tactical Command (OTC): (b)(6)

1. Callsign: **ALFA ONE** – (b)(6)
2. Callsign: **ALFA TWO** – (b)(6) (OTC when COMNDW is not available)

On Scene Commander (OSC): (b)(6)

1. Callsign: **ALFA THREE**

Participants: NDW, NSAW, RDC, MARBKS

Communications: Unsecure VHF Voice Comms

1. OB TAC: OSC and all assigned support personnel
2. NDW ROC: OTC/OSC and designated senior leaders ONLY
3. WYSDISP: Emergency communication to Regional Dispatch Center (RDC)

Instructions:


1. When directed by OTC/OSC all units activate and monitor OB TAC.
2. OSC directs NDW ROC and OB TAC.
3. OB TAC will be used to coordinate personnel and vehicle movement to and from event site.
4. DO NOT initiate personal conversations.
5. DO NOT discuss sensitive information or POTUS movement.
6. Acknowledge all orders with "Roger Out"
7. For Police, Fire or Medical assistance contact the RDC on WYSDISP.

Cell Phone/Landline Redundancy

1. RDC (**Emergency**): 202-433-3333
2. OSC: 301-247-8167
3. Regional Operations Center: 202-433-5180
4. RDC Non-Emergency: 202-433-4201

5th Street

M
METRO
3 BLOCKS



6TH
STREET
GATE

7th Street

M Street SE

8th Street

9TH
STREET
GATE

11th Street

11TH
STREET
GATE

10TH
STREET
GATE

Issac Hull Ave.

Patterson Ave.

Paulding Ave.

Dahlgren Ave.

Parsons Ave.

Tingey Crescent

10th Street

11th Street

Seward St.

Kennon Ave.

Jefferson Sq.

Tingey Ave.

Warrington Ave.

Stevens St.

O Street

N Street

Norton Place

Buchanan St.

Display Ship Barr.
DD-933

Anacostia River

River Walk

10TH
STREET
GATE

11TH
STREET
GATE

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(b)(6)

CIV RLISO, NDW

From: (b)(6) CIV NSA Washington HQ, N5
Sent: Monday, September 16, 2013 15:07
To: NSA WASHINGTON TENANT_SENIOR LEADERSHIP-CO; NSA WASHINGTON
TENANT_SENIOR LEADERSHIP-XO
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY WASHINGTON NAVAL SUPPORT FACILITIES -- OTHER THAN
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD
Signed By: joseph.mooney@navy.mil
Importance: High

NSA Washington Tenant Senior Leadership,

NSF Arlington, United States Naval Observatory, Suitland, Naval Research Laboratory, Carderock

On behalf of Captain Ulmer, NSAW Commanding Officer.

NSAW Commanding Officer has ordered Force Protection BRAVO to be immediately set for: NSF Arlington, United States Naval Observatory, Suitland, Naval Research Laboratory, and Carderock. Once onsite NSAW Security Forces set Force Protection BRAVO, Commands may release their staff. As of now, it is projected that Tuesday, 17 September will be a normal work day for these facilities.

The Washington Navy Yard (WNY) environment is still uncertain and remains at Force Protection Delta and locked down, no one in - no one out for the immediate future. Once the process is determined, all personnel located on the WNY will be vetted by federal law enforcement prior to being allowed to depart the WNY. Many questions remain and guidance will be provided once determined.

v/r,

(b)(6)

Strategic Services Integrator (N5)

Naval Support Activity Washington
1411 Parsons Ave SE
Washington Navy DC 20374-5003

(BB)(b)(6)

(Desk) 202-433-6465

(b)(6)

How is NSAW doing? Please let us know by using our ICE survey.
https://ice.disa.mil/index.cfm?fa=site&site_id=809

(b)(6)

CIV RLSD, NDW

From: (b)(6) CIV NDW HQ, N00P
Sent: Friday, September 27, 2013 15:04
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: NDW PAO Weekly Report 12Sep-18Sep
Attachments: NDW_WeeklyReport 27Sep13.docx
Signed By: (b)(6)

NDW PAO weekly report attached.

v/r

(b)(6)

Deputy Public Affairs Officer

Naval District Washington

COMM: (202) 433-9714

Blackberry: (b)(6)

Fax: (202) 433-3745

DSN: 288-9714

(b)(6)

"Like Us" on Facebook and follow us on Twitter to get up-to-date information on NDW!

<http://www.facebook.com/NavDistWash>

<http://twitter.com/NavalDistWash>

N00P update for 25 Sep - 3 Oct 13

CNIC ACTION ITEMS/ISSUES OF CONCERN:

- NSTR

NDW SA/FYI ITEMS:

PAO Cell: The PAO cell is up and running with NDW, CNIC, and CHINFO reps, others virtually. Conducted media availabilities with (b)(6) on the services provided to those affected by the events of September 16th. Additionally, members of the Emergency Family Assistance Center (EFAC), the Special Psychiatric Rapid Intervention Team (SPRINT) and the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) discussed the care and assistance provided.

News organizations that were present included Navy Times, WTTG Fox 5, WJLA Channel 8, WUSA Channel 9, Washington Post, WTOP, NBC 4, and WNEW-FM.

PERIODIC UPDATES:

- NSTR

MEDIA:

Coverage of EFAC Ops from 26 Sep media engagement.

Dogs providing support, comfort for Navy Yard employees

Article: <http://www.myfoxdc.com/story/23543099/dogs-providing-support-comfort-for-navy-yard-employees>

Video: <http://www.myfoxdc.com/story/23543099/dogs-providing-support-comfort-for-navy-yard-employees?autoStart=true&topVideoCatNo=default&clipId=9351059>

Service Dogs Aid with Comfort at Washington Navy Yard

http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=76824

Dog Give Hope to Navy Yard Employees

<http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Dogs-Give-Hope-to-Navy-Yard-Employees-225323002.html>

Grief Counselors, Dogs Help Navy Yard Survivors

<http://www.usatoday.com/videos/news/2013/09/26/2880025/>

Navy Yard Employees Get Counseling After Massacre

<http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/navy-yard-employees-counseling-massacre-20389266?singlePage=true>

Navy considering changes to building 197

<http://www.wtop.com/109/3465217/Navy-considering-changes-to-building-197>

Media continue to pull and repurpose information from the NDW Facebook page. NDW Facebook follower now at 5,334.

- **Media Queries:**
 - The Enterprise, (b)(6) , 1-any concerns with security at NAS in light comments about security issues at WNY; 2-importance of recognizing Gold Star Families.
 - (b)(6)
- (b)(6)

UPCOMING EVENTS:

(b)(6)

TRAVEL/LEAVE IN NEXT WEEK:

-

(b)(6)

CIV RLSO, NDW

From:

(b)(6)

CNIC HQ, N00P

Sent:

Friday, September 27, 2013 9:33

To:

(b)(6)

Cc:

(b)(6)

Cc:

(b)(6)

Subject: NEWS: Navy.mil - SECNAV Announces Washington Navy Yard Investigation
Signed By: (b)(6)

Subject: SECNAV Announces Washington Navy Yard Investigation

SECNAV Announces WNY Investigation

Story Number: NNS130926-20

Release Date: 9/26/2013 7:31:00 PM

From Secretary of the Navy Public Affairs WASHINGTON (NNS) -- Secretary of the Navy (b)(6) announced Sept. 26 that the Navy will conduct an official investigation into the fatal shooting incident at the Washington Navy Yard Sept. 16.

(b)(6) Director Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, is designated as the investigating officer.

"In the aftermath of the Sept. 16 tragedy at the Naval Sea Systems Command Headquarters at the Washington Navy Yard, it is critical for the Navy to undertake a comprehensive, critical assessment of all factors leading up to or influencing this devastating event," said (b)(6). "This assessment must identify and address relevant deficiencies, if any, in Navy policies and procedures in order to ensure the continued safety and well-being of all Department of the Navy and contractor personnel."

The investigation into the incident will address associated security, personnel, and contracting policies and practices, in an effort to identify any deficiencies in or noncompliance with applicable laws or regulations.

The report of findings will be submitted in November.

http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=76842

-30-

(b)(6)

CIV RLSO, NDW

From: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00P
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2013 10:01
To: CNIC ALL HANDS
Cc:

(b)(6)

Subject: NEWS: Washingtonian - Across the River From Navy Yard, Families and Witnesses Find Relief

Signed By: (b)(6)

Across the River From Navy Yard, Families and Witnesses Find Relief

In the aftermath of the Navy Yard massacre, the staff of another Washington military base is making sure the victims' families and shooting survivors get the help they need.

By (b)(6)

The first hours of last Monday's shooting spree at Washington Navy Yard were wracked by reporting errors. One of the most blaring miscues, though one taken very gravely in the unfolding violence, was a quick report that there had been another shooting incident at Joint Base Anacostia Bolling, an installation across the river from where Navy Yard contractor (b)(6) was gunning down his coworkers.

Nothing like that happened at Bolling. The Navy and Air Force base, which is also home to the Defense Intelligence Agency, had its own brief period of lockdown, but it was not long before the staff at Bolling started preparing for the aftermath of the shootings at the Navy Yard.

"My leadership from the Navy Yard contacted me and said, 'Hey, this is going to have some significant impact both short- and long-term and we're going to need to start planning for that now'," (b)(6), Bolling's commander, tells Washingtonian. By one o'clock that afternoon, (b)(6) was talking with the Navy about an EFAC—an Emergency Family Assistance Center, a collection of human services where victims' relatives and survivors can get help in one location.

(b)(6), the EFAC's director, says it happened quicker than that. By early afternoon, mental-health workers and Red Cross volunteers had marshaled themselves at a parking lot outside Nationals Park down the street from Navy Yard where waves of evacuating employees were arriving from the locked-down base.

Meanwhile, back at Bolling, phone calls started flooding the lines of the social workers dispatched to the EFAC. Navy Yard workers who witnessed (b)(6) rampage or even heard about it from across the base had had their senses of workplace security shattered.

"You could hear the anxiety," (b)(6), Bolling's supervising clinical social worker, recalls. "How am I going to handle this? How am I going to cope?" There were more phone calls on Tuesday, another batch on Wednesday, but the busiest day was probably Thursday, says (b)(6). That's when all Navy Yard employees finally went back to work after two days of essential-personnel-only orders.

But the cluster of rooms on the ground floor of Enterprise Hall, a stately, red-brick Colonial Revival compound that sticks out from Bolling's boxy modern structures, is still busy. There are stations manned by the judge advocate general, the FBI victims' assistance program, the DC Crime Victims Compensation Fund, chaplains, and numerous social workers. Volunteers from the American Red Cross supplement the base's staff and provide snacks and refreshments. But the whole operation was launched within a few hours of the first shots being fired, says (b)(6).

Not surprisingly, the bulk of the phone calls are coming from people who work at Navy Yard's Building 197, where (b)(6) carried out his spree that claimed the lives of 12 other civilian contractors. Now, the 3,000 people who work in that

building, along with many of the 13,000 other people who work on the base, are trying to get back to normal, even though what counts for “normal” has shifted.

From (b)(6) remarks at a memorial service Sunday night, last Monday’s events at Navy Yard reinforce a twisted new normal in which mass shootings almost seem routine. “Part of what wears on us, what troubles us so deeply as we gather here today, is how this senseless violence that took place in the Navy Yard echoes other recent tragedies,” (b)(6) said.

(b)(6) says he’s witnessing a “renewed sense of anxiety,” similar to what he felt after 9/11. But there’s a tangible difference between the circumstances faced by active-duty military during wartime and the civilian workers who work on domestic military bases, even if many of the Navy Yard victims were veterans.

“Some day I’m going to take this uniform off and I’m going to put on a coat and tie,” says (b)(6), who has been in the Navy for 25 years. “I’m sure my family is going to say to themselves, ‘Okay, that time in our lives is over now. We can take a step back and relax a little bit.’”

That sense of ease has been shattered for the families of victims like (b)(6) a 22-year Navy man who left active duty in 2003, or (b)(6) who spent 29 years in the Army.

There could still be a difficult path ahead for the victims’ coworkers, too, whether they were in Building 197 fleeing (b)(6) shots or evacuating other buildings on the Navy Yard, (b)(6) and (b)(6) say. While much of Bolling’s EFAC help is aimed directly to the families of the deceased, the biggest job is to help the Navy Yard’s full workforce—uniformed and civilian alike—cope with what they endured.

“Some people are going to feel it right away,” (b)(6) says. “Some people will feel it later on. Some of them may be very numb, just like when someone close to you dies, you may go numb for a while and then when it’s safe or you’re ready that’s when you start crying.”

To the soldiers and civilians staffing the EFAC, the most important thing is that resources are available around the clock after an incident with the potential to leave witnesses with post-traumatic stress disorder. Navy Yard workers might encounter the same mental symptoms as troops wounded in combat in a distant theater, and the EFAC is assembled to provide a rapid response.

In some ways, it’s an improvement over what is offered to active-duty troops, says Air Force (b)(6) (b)(6) Bolling’s senior enlisted leader.

“Many days are a struggle for me just to begin with,” (b)(6), who suffered a traumatic brain injury during an 11-month deployment in Afghanistan, says. “I didn’t get a chance to get any type of social services the entire time. When I got back I immediately knew I needed to get assistance and mental health. But for me, too much time had gone by to build resiliency when I really needed to do it.”

(b)(6) who is accompanied by an energetic black lab named (b)(6), says the distress of last Monday was mitigated because he had a mission to carry out, in making sure Bolling was secure. Since then, he has worked to ensure that people at Navy Yard are aware of the services being provided across the Anacostia River.

Getting to them early makes a crucial difference. "With the EFAC we have and our proactively going out there and reaching these people, I have a good feeling these people won't have to suffer like a lot of folks who have come back from Iraq and Afghanistan have," (b)(6) says.

The 700 or so people who had called the EFAC through Friday morning are just a fraction of the thousands who work at Navy Yard, and even though the center was quieting down headed into the weekend, the operation is not ending any time soon. The EFAC lasts "as long as it takes," (b)(6) says.

And it will take a toll on the people offering aid and guidance to the survivors and witnesses. (b)(6) says that while it's an affirming thing to help people cope through a traumatic experience, listening to so many stories takes a toll.

(b)(6) felt it early on in the process when he was ordered to head to Nationals Park to help with the Navy Yard workers being evacuated last Monday night.

"I was getting our EFAC numbers out to people, and then one of the families of the victims showed up, and that's when it hit me," (b)(6) recalls, his voice clenching and eyes tightening. "That's when it got hard. That's when I had to take a little bit of time to go compose myself, because that's when it came back to roost."

The military drills its people for emergencies like these and (b)(6) is proud to know how quickly his team organized last week. But he notes grimly that their response, to the 20th such incident since 2009 to claim at least four lives, has become almost routine.

"It's almost sad to note we're getting better and better at handling this," (b)(6) says.

(b)(6)

CIV RLSD, NDW

From: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00P
Sent: Thursday, September 26, 2013 19:10
To: (b)(6) CNIC HQ, N00
Cc:

(b)(6)

Subject: NEWS: AP - Navy Yard Employees Get Counseling After Massacre
Signed By: (b)(6)

Admiral, AP print story as a result of today's media engagement.

Vr,
(b)(6)

<http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/navy-yard-employees-counseling-massacre-20389266?singlePage=true>

Navy Yard Employees Get Counseling After Massacre
WASHINGTON September 27, 2013 (AP)

By ERIC TUCKER Associated Press

(b)(6) is accustomed to responding to a hazardous materials spill or ferocious natural disaster from his post at the Washington Navy Yard's emergency operations center.

A panicked call of shots fired that reached his radio on the morning of Sept. 16 presented a chilling new challenge.

"It was terrifying," (b)(6), a 35-year-old Navy electronics technician who runs the center, recalled in an interview Thursday about the shooting of 12 people inside Building 197.

Ten days later, (b)(6) remains haunted by that morning.

When a base-wide announcement system was tested in the days after the shooting - the same system he had used to declare the base on lockdown - he said he "got a little freaked out." When he leaves work at the end of his shift, or when he goes to pick up his children, he panics that a similar disaster will strike the base and he won't be there - or maybe no one will - to respond.

"I worry about not being there to receive the call when it happens, he said.

(b)(6) has received both group and one-on-one counseling since the shooting, and he's hardly alone. Navy officials say counselors have so far interacted with more than 6,000 employees at the Navy Yard, many of whom were inside Building 197 when former Navy reservist (b)(6) - who worked there as an IT contractor - opened fire with a shotgun. He was killed by a police officer more than an hour after the shooting began.

A specialized team that responds to industrial accidents, death on bases and other traumatic events deployed from Virginia to Washington, with counselors checking in with workers at the water cooler or on smoke break. Some employees have attended large group counseling sessions or scheduled one-on-one appointments.

"We're hearing the wide range of normal. People are scared, they're angry, they're sad. Some have lost co-workers. Everyone on the base has been impacted one way or another," said Navy (b)(6), a leader of the Special Psychiatric Rapid Intervention Team, or SPRINT, in Portsmouth, Va., adding, "We try to get out and touch as many people as we can."

The counselors stress to workers that they're experiencing normal reactions to an abnormal event, a message (b)(6) said he especially appreciates as he revisits memories of the "shocked" faces of the first responders and the laundry list of responsibilities he performed that day - from alerting his chain of command, processing messages from Building 197 and spreading word that the base was on lockdown.

"Every duty day, every shift I've ever been on, we've always prepared for events like this. And you train and you train and you train, and however much training you do, you always hope that nothing will ever happen. It happened, though, and thankfully I had that training to rely on."

The aid is a way to offer support to stressed-out workers but also to help the base regain a semblance of normalcy. Building 197 remains closed and is still considered a crime scene, its workers displaced.

And signs of the shooting, both subtle and overt, are present through the Navy Yard: bouquets of flowers left at the base of a public art sculpture near an entrance gate, a large police communications vehicle parked outside, Red Cross workers handing out food and therapy dogs strolling the grounds with their handlers.

(b)(6) was suffering from delusions in the month leading up to the shooting, leaving a note that he was driven to kill because of bombardment by extremely low frequency radio waves, the FBI said. The FBI also released surveillance footage Wednesday showing (b)(6) hunting victims with a shotgun, a decision that angered defense officials who worried that the disturbing video would re-ignite panic and stress for workers at the Navy Yard. The FBI defended that decision Thursday, citing the tremendous public interest in the shooting.

Meanwhile, the Navy on Thursday ordered an in-depth investigation into the shooting and the events that led up to it, including a detailed look at the shooter, his mental health background and whether any adverse information was ever reported to the service about him.

The SPRINT team expects to be on the base through the end of next week as demand for services - which was high early this week - starts to wane. Most won't require long-term mental health care.

"What we hope and what we expect is that most people will return to normal," (b)(6) said.

(b)(6)

CIV RLSO, NDW

From: (b)(6) CIV NSA Washington HQ, N5
Sent: Monday, September 16, 2013 8:45
To: NSA WASHINGTON WNY_TENANT_SENIOR LEADERSHIP-XO; NSA WASHINGTON WNY_TENANT_SENIOR LEADERSHIP-CO
Cc: (b)(6) CIV NSA Washington HQ, N5
Subject: NOT A DRILL --- WASHINGTON NAVY YARD SHELTER IN PLACE
Signed By: (b)(6)
Importance: High

ALL

Not a drill!

Active Shooter in Building 197 1st Floor -- Shelter in Place. NSAW Security and METRO PD responding.

Maybe more than one shooter!

Sent On behalf of (b)(6) NSA Washington Commanding Officer

v/r

(b)(6)

Strategic Services Integrator (N5)

Naval Support Activity Washington
1411 Parsons Ave SE
Washington Navy DC 20374-5003

(BB) (b)(6)

(Desk) 202-433-6465

(b)(6)

How is NSAW doing? Please let us know by using our ICE survey.
https://ice.disa.mil/index.cfm?fa=site&site_id=809

(b)(6)

CIV RLSD, NDW

From: (b)(6) CIV NDW WNYD, N00P
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2013 7:57
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: PA Update

Public Affairs Update
PA phone conference this am with CHINFO and CNIC.

CHINFO Focus Today:

1. CHINFO has the lead on bio data for the suspected gunman (b)(6). Focus will be on his time in the Navy.
2. Physical Security: Questions will arise on base access procedures. CNIC developing enterprise wide Q&A, but specific WNY procedures will be deferred to NDW. Also may receive questions regarding the NCACS IG report and relationship to the suspected gunman's access (CHINFO lead).
3. Information Push: Need to continue to push information to the workforce through all available means. N9 updates are key here. NDW PA will be actively communicating online and through media today with installation status info and available services. CI mentioned getting (b)(6) on local media.
4. There will be a wreath laying at the Navy Memorial today at 1000. Low key event, but media are invited
5. Memorial service plans in the works-- POTUS level.

NDW Focus: communication with workforce

v/r
(b)(6)
Director, Public Affairs
Naval District Washington
DSN: 288-2678
Comm: (202)433-2678
Fax: (202)433-3745
Mobile: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

"Like Us" on Facebook and follow us on Twitter to get up-to-date information on NDW!
<http://www.facebook.com/NavDistWash>
<http://twitter.com/NavalDistWash>

(b)(6)

CIV RLSD, NDW

From:

(b)(6)

NDW HQ, N00

Sent:

Friday, September 20, 2013 9:33

To:

(b)(6)

Cc:

(b)(6)

Subject:

Phone Bridge

(b)(6)

NSWC-DD is to provide manning for bridge - 24x7 if necessary. If NSWC-DD CO should call (b)(6) if he has any questions on level of support expected. They should take over and run this as their mission with your support/assistance where needed.

(b)(6), Am concerned one 8 phone line may not be enough to support the 1500 or so calls expected over next 36 hrs. Need another 8x line.

W/r COS

(b)(6)

CIV RLSO, NDW

From: (b)(6) JB Anacostia/Bolling HQ, JB00
Sent: Thursday, September 19, 2013 11:53
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6) CIV NDW WNYD, N00P
Subject: Press conference concerns

Importance: High

Sir,

(b)(6). Is here with me at the EFAC. The family meeting at the club has been smooth out front but a challenge behind the scenes. The crowd is very emotional as you can understand. The families will be informed of the EFAC and given directions right after their meeting. I fear they may arrive during the press conference (b)(6) has scheduled for 1245. We recommend pushing that back 90 min to avoid a potential interaction between press and victim families. The press will behave themselves, but their mere presents may be troubling.

(b)(6) is reaching out to CNIC to see if a delay is reasonable.

VR,

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

CIV RLSD, NDW

From:

(b)(6)

Sent:

Thursday, September 19, 2013 14:58

To:

(b)(6)

Cc:

(b)(6)

Subject:

RE: 1130 MBW Meeting

Attachments:

MBW Seating Chart.pptx

Signed By:

(b)(6)

Good afternoon Ladies and Gentlemen,

Attached is the seating diagram of the bleachers aboard Marine Barracks Washington, D.C.

Please feel free to contact me with any additional questions or concerns.

Thank you!

Very Respectfully,

(b)(6)

Protocol Director

Marine Barracks Washington D.C.

202-433-6083

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6)

NDW HQ, N00 [mailto:(b)(6)]

Sent: Thursday, September 19, 2013 9:29 AM

To: (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: 1130 MBW Meeting

(b)(6),

I'll be there. (b)(6) will be escorting SECNAV around WNY at that time. (b)(6) , XP of NAS Pax River has been pulled up here as NDW's Lead for this event. She, along with other members of the NDW team will be present.

V/r, (b)(6)

(b)(6) USN
COS/Deputy Commandant
Naval District Washington
O - (202) 433-3737
M - (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) OPNAV, DNS

Sent: Thursday, September 19, 2013 8:50

To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: RE: 1130 MBW Meeting

(b)(6) , I am attending and DNS was hoping yourself and maybe your boss attend. For all: items DNS wants reviewed:

1. Speakers: POTUS, SECDEF, SECNAV, CNO and Mayor? Maybe NAVSEA.
2. Location for the POTUS to visit with families and a room in that location for 1 on 1s.
3. Are we inviting the wounded, their caregivers, etc?
4. What is the Max Capacity? We will want chairs and seating charts for Families, VIPs, etc.
5. Navy Centric - Navy Band, Navy Ceremonial Guard, etc... DNS is speaking with DMCS concerning USMC support.
6. Escorts? Uniform - SBD?
7. Guest arrival times for screening by USSS?
8. Family and Wounded arrival times?
9. Parking at 8th and I along with WNY for guest? Sailors lined up for those who walk from WNY to 8th and I, on the street to direct guest.
10. Invites? VIPs, 1st responders, MEDSTAR, Chief of Police, local Officials, etc... who running and developing the invite list? That list will need to be vetted by SECNAV protocol.

More to follow at the meeting as DNS is talking with CNIC: VR(b)(6)

(b)(6) USN
Deputy Director Navy Staff
2000 Navy Pentagon, RM 4E562
nopr:(b)(6)
sopr:(b)(6)
Office: 703-693-4444
DSN: 312-223-4444
BB: (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) , , SECNAV, Front Office
Sent: Thursday, September 19, 2013 8:25 AM
To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: 1130 MBW Meeting

Good morning all,

This morning's 1130 meeting at Marine Barracks will focus on:

- Event Setup
- Meet and Greet with families
- Guest List
- Guests Logistics (VIP List, parking, public transport, when doors open)
- Press logistics

WH and USSS are bringing a pretty large team.

See you there.


V/r,

(b)(6)
Office of the Secretary of the Navy
703-614-9665

8th Street

Main Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate Gate

Gate 9 Gate 8 Gate 7 Gate 4 Gate 2 Gate 1



(b)(6)

CIV RLSD, NDW

From: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Sent: Wednesday, September 25, 2013 8:50
To: (b)(6) SES CNRMA, DCOM
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Deployment Order
Signed By: (b)(6)

Thanks (b)(6) we sincerely appreciate the great support!

v/r

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) SES CNRMA, DCOM
Sent: Wednesday, September 25, 2013 7:42 AM
To: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: FW: Deployment Order

Admiral,

A short note to let you know that we're working subj DEPOD. Additional details to follow later in the day.

VR/(b)(6)

AMPN/THIS IS A COMUSFLTFORCOM DEPLOYMENT ORDER (DEPOD) DIRECTING DEPLOYMENT OF A SELECTED REGIONAL SECURITY FORCE (RSF) TO THE WASHINGTON NAVY YARD (WNY).
GENTEXT/SITUATION/1. WNY SECURITY FORCE IS ENGAGED IN PROVIDING CRIME SCENE SECURITY ON AN ONGOING BASIS. COMUSFLTFORCOM, IN COORDINATION WITH COMMANDER NAVY INSTALLATIONS COMMAND (CNIC) AND CNDW, PROVIDES A RSF TO WNY.
GENTEXT/MISSION.2. COMUSFLTFORCOM ICW CNDW AND COMMANDER NAVY REGION MID ATLANTIC (CNRMA) PROVIDES SELECTED REGIONAL SECURITY FORCE FROM NRMA TO CNDW IN SUPPORT NWY.
GENTEXT/EXECUTION.3. EXECUTION.
3.A. FOR CNRMA, PROVIDE REGIONAL SECURITY FORCE IAW THE DIRECTION BELOW AND ICW CNDW.
3.A.1. ACTIVATE AND DEPLOY ONE REGIONAL SECURITY FORCE TO AUGMENT THE WNY SECURITY FORCE FROM 23 SEPTEMBER THROUGH 18 NOVEMBER 2013.
3.B. REDEPLOY REGIONAL SECURITY FORCE ON MISSION COMPLETION OR AS DIRECTED BY SUPPORTED REGION COMMANDER. NO REDEPLOYMENT ORDERS WILL BE ISSUED. REPORT REDEPLOYMENT TO COMUSFLTFORCOM AND CNIC.
3.B.1 NOTIONAL SECURITY FORCE COMPOSITION:
1 X COMMISSIONED OFFICER OR GS-12 OR ABOVE
2 X E-7
4 X E-6
10 X E-5
34 X E-4 OR BELOW.

3.B.2. PROVIDE NAME, RANK, PHONE NUMBER, E-MAIL ADDRESS AND ASSIGNED LOCATION OF DEPLOYED PERSONNEL TO COMUSFLTFORCOM.

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/4. ADMIN AND LOG.

4.A. DEPLOY SECURITY FORCE UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF CNMRA AND TACTICAL CONTROL OF COMMANDING OFFICER, NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY (NSA) WASHINGTON.

4.B. IF REQUESTED BY COMMANDING OFFICER, NSA WASHINGTON TO PROCEED TO ANOTHER LOCATION OTHER THAN FIRST DEPLOYED, NOTIFY COMUSFLTFORCOM AND CNIC TO ENABLE MODIFICATIONS TO THIS DEPOD.

4.C. ROTATION OF SECURITY FORCE PERSONNEL IS AUTHORIZED AS NECESSARY; ENSURE SEAMLESS TRANSITION.

4.D. DEPLOYED SECURITY FORCE OFFICER IN CHARGE SHALL PROVIDE DAILY SITREPS TO THE COMUSFLTFORCOM BATTLE WATCH CAPTAIN (BWC) VIA EMAIL (PRI), BWC.FFC(AT)NAVY.MIL, OR VOICE (SEC) 757-836-5397 AND INFO COMUSFLTFORCOM ATP USFF_NFLT_N042_FP_STAFF(AT)NAVY.MIL.

5.A. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS.

5.A.1. COMUSFLTFORCOM EXERCISES TACON FOR FORCE PROTECTION OF ALL NAVY FORCES IN CONUS.

5.A.2. CNDW IS THE SUPPORTED COMMANDER.

5.A.3 CNRMA IS THE SUPPORTING COMMANDER.

5.A.4. DIRLAUTH BETWEEN CNDW AND CNRMA..

GENTEXT/AUTHENTICATION/RELEASED BY (b)(6), N33, USFF.

USFF ATP POCS ARE (b)(6), N042/FP, E-MAIL: (b)(6)

(b)(6), N042/FP, E-MAIL: (b)(6)

E-MAIL: BWC.FFC(AT)NAVY.MIL, PHONE: 757-836-5397.

AKNLDG/YES//

PHONE: 757-836-5372, (b)(6)

, PHONE: 757-836-6260. USFF BWC,

V/R

(b)(6)

CNRMA Watch Officer

Regional Operations Center

NIPR: CNRMA_ROCWO.fct@navy.mil

SIPR: cnrma.rocwo.fct@navy.smil.mil

Tel: 757-322-2609

Fax: 757-445-5757

(b)(6)

CIV RLSD, NDW

From: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 18:50
To: (b)(6) CIV NDW DLGR, N6
Subject: RE: Fwd: Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say
Signed By: (b)(6)

Thanks (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) CIV NDW DLGR, N6
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 6:46 PM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: Fw: Fwd: Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say

FYI
VR/
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
NDW N6
540-850-5177

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6) CIV CNIC HQ, N6
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 06:38 PM
To: (b)(6) CIV NDW DLGR, N6
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: Fw: Fwd: Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say

Nicely done (b)(6) vr (b)(6)

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6) USN OSD DOD CIO (US) [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 06:12 PM
To: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Fwd: Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say

Sir,

I spoke with (b)(6) who is the N6 for Naval District Washington. Their public safety system is made by (b)(6) and based on the 7100 series handheld radio operating in the 380-400 MHz range. It is an Army-owned system providing Joint coverage in the NCR and is tied in to the Public Safety Network. (b)(6) also told me that they are

in the process of refreshing the 7100 series hardware with the new Unity radios, (also from (b)(6)) but that procurement is not yet complete. I also learned that there have been studies that show incomplete radio coverage inside some of the higher security buildings on site due to the presence of SCIF build-outs and TEMPEST hardening. These features are specifically designed to shield RF signals, so they exacerbate the problem of using a radio inside the building. (b)(6) says there have been union complaints about this and that they have purchased portable repeater units for the fire department to take in to help boost communications inside structures.

Based on the news report, (b)(6) (Commander Naval Installations Command) has directed an independent investigation into the radio performance during the shooting response. (b)(6) staff is in the process of gathering all of the radio logs and system data for the time period in question. The investigating team will review that data and interview those that were involved to make an official determination as to what actually took place.

I have copied (b)(6) on this e-mail and ask that he please correct me if I have reported any of the above information incorrectly. We are standing by to provide additional information as necessary.

V/R,
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) SES OSD DOD CIO (US)
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 9:11 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Fwd: Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say

(b)(6)

I need you to look into this. I have no idea what frequency band the Navy Yard first responders use. But I do know that if their radios were in the 136-150 Mhz range that band does not work well indoors. I know that from first-hand experience. You need to be in the upper 400's to have any reasonable capability. We need to get to the root cause before people start jumping to conclusions.

Thanks

(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) SES OSD DOD CIO (US)
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 9:04 AM
To: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: Fw: Fwd: Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say

Help please...

From: (b)(6) [mailto:(b)(6)]
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 12:15 PM Coordinated Universal Time
To: (b)(6) SES OSD DOD CIO (US)
Cc: (b)(6)

Subject: Fwd: Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say

(b)(6)

As the busiest girl in the Pentagon, can I ask if you or anyone in your office knows or can quickly find out, who manufactured the Fed radios that failed in the Navy Yard shooting? I'm copying (b)(6) for her awareness because this is an important data point for (b)(6) - First Net chairman - who is likely going to be asked by (b)(6) and (b)(6) and possibly others today.

Thanks so much,

(b)(6)

Sent from my Verizon Wireless 4G LTE smartphone

----- Original message -----

From: '(b)(6)

Date: 09/19/2013 6:12 PM (GMT-05:00)

To: (b)(6)

Subject: FW: Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say

(b)(6) might bring this up tomorrow

<http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?e=001v0KiaRyJHz3VAv0pXDA_s6F5owj7B-ZebePL6PNEuh_FiEWxKAW4dHZ4ra-YjvJWZFYMSgeSqGYFar3iPSnRxbUE8eKM1Ffl4ZHPPuiMG9mvY8itlZnZPsGqmNxA-u4m>

<<http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?e=001v0KiaRyJHz2ztuC3djSQNS05AUHpPwnV39rpYOca7JsL1DNIfqQuxPZruGM2RspRFHtDbw-pJ1pr65evnmZvmHAaD2VaCtdxw-EuW3iIYz7k=>>

News from The Hill:

Radios failed during Navy Yard attack, first responders say By (b)(6)

Radios for federal firefighters and police officers failed during Monday's mass shooting at Washington's Navy Yard, according to union representatives for first responders.

Union officials said police and firefighters resorted to using their cell phones and radios from D.C.'s emergency responders to communicate with each other during the attack.

Initially, officers found that their radios were working. But as they ventured deeper into the building where the shooting took place, their equipment stopped functioning.

"They had to use their cellphone to just call out and tell them what's going on," said (b)(6), chairman of the Fraternal Order of Police Naval District Washington (NDW) Labor Committee.

Read the story here.

<http://r20.rs6.net/tn.jsp?e=001v0KiaRyJHz24nQN3ZMKxTjZrNZvVV1YMB_Q58Zo6oMOckrF8Mh3fCvKHJnxUaCsoevXtPBhAGm6BGSPvA9EfrP3yETq9DtWVwehAjt6NuLilbysnWPPC9zdXyFbwUvUM3r_zOnSZhGy6TrNi8V-s38xp2ok5_8Mw-Br7mV3_tAMdWuY9Q0XKGD9iTr4GhKssoAw1pe-t4BGaQfjGC6NgY-J7aVLV7RwH>

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(b)(6)

CIV RLISO, NDW

From: (b)(6) CIV NCIS, 22
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2013 13:10
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: Re: Joint Information Center

----- Original Message -----

From: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2013 12:57 PM
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Subject: Joint Information Center

(b)(6), (b)(6) ,

CNIC and NDW are standing up a Joint Information Center (JIC) to manage our PA campaign and coordinate RTQs, etc. among affected Navy commands. NCIS will have a rep to coordinate on their end and with the external law enforcement agencies such as Metro Police and FBI.

Request NAVSEA and NAVFAC plan to provide a rep for the JIC, which will locate in the spaces to be assigned in the CNIC HQ building (W111).

On the NAVFAC side I envision a range of questions involving the ATRP Program as well as facilities questions, including UFC requirements, insight into B197 construction, plans (long and short term) for the displaced NAVSEA workforce, etc.

On the NAVSEA side I envision questions ranging from how notifications went down to family members of victims to how workforce security improved (or not) with the move from Crystal City to B197.

More to follow as we get this up and running.

V/r, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Chief of Staff/Deputy Commandant
Naval District Washington
1343 Dahlgren Avenue South East, Building 1 Washington Navy Yard Washington, DC 20374-5161
Office: (202) 433-3737
Mobile: (b)(6)

Fax: (202) 433-2207

Email: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

CIV RLISO, NDW

From: (b)(6) NAVSEA, SEA 00
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2013 13:22
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: Joint Information Center

(b)(6)
Understand.
r/(b)(6)

(b)(6)
(b)(6) USN
EA COMNAVSEA
(b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2013 12:58
To: (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Subject: Joint Information Center

(b)(6), (b)(6) ,

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More to follow as we get this up and running.

V/r, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Chief of Staff/Deputy Commandant

Naval District Washington

1343 Dahlgren Avenue South East, Building 1

Washington Navy Yard

Washington, DC 20374-5161

Office: (202) 433-3737

Mobile: (b)(6)

Fax: (202) 433-2207

Email: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

CIV RLSD, NDW

From: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2013 16:20
To: (b)(6)
Subject: RE: MDW offer to assist
Signed By: (b)(6)

That's N3 (b)(6), not CoS

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6) NDW HQ, N00
Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2013 4:20 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: MDW offer to assist
Importance: High

(b)(6),

(b)(6) offered whatever assistance we could use on Monday and I spoke with him today and suggested we might be able to use additional Security Forces iso the anticipated Memorial Service on Sunday.

I passed him your contact info and expect his G3 to be in touch with you shortly.

r/(b)(6)